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APPROXIMATING THE NASH SOCIAL WELFARE WITH
BUDGET-ADDITIVE VALUATIONS∗
JUGAL GARG† , MARTIN HOEFER‡ , AND KURT MEHLHORN§
Abstract. We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the
Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents with budget-additive valuation func-
tions. Budget-additive valuations represent an important class of submodular functions. They have
attracted a lot of research interest in recent years due to many interesting applications. For every
ε > 0, our algorithm obtains a (2.404 + ε)-approximation in time polynomial in the input size and
1/ε.
Our algorithm relies on rounding an approximate equilibrium in a linear Fisher market where
sellers have earning limits (upper bounds on the amount of money they want to earn) and buyers
have utility limits (upper bounds on the amount of utility they want to achieve). In contrast to
markets with either earning or utility limits, these markets have not been studied before. They turn
out to have fundamentally different properties.
Although the existence of equilibria is not guaranteed, we show that the market instances arising
from the Nash social welfare problem always have an equilibrium. Further, we show that the set
of equilibria is not convex, answering a question of [17]. We design an FPTAS to compute an
approximate equilibrium. We show that the problem of computing an exact equilibrium lies in the
intersection of classes PLS (Polynomial Local Search) and PPAD (Polynomial Parity Algorithms on
Directed Graphs). For a constant number of buyers or goods, we give a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute an exact equilibrium.
1. Introduction. One of the most fundamental problems in markets is to al-
locate a heterogeneous set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each agent
has a valuation for the received items. Over the last decades, variants of this prob-
lem have attracted an enormous amount of research interest in economics, computer
science, and operations research. The problem captures basic assignment tasks that
arise in many applications, e.g., when assigning goods to customers in online mar-
kets or resources to users in computer networks. The predominant approach in al-
gorithmic research concerns optimization of social welfare: Allocate items to max-
imize the sum of valuations. Over the last two decades, a rich understanding of
algorithms for optimizing and approximating social welfare has been derived (see,
e.g., [27, 52, 40, 24, 23, 36, 10] and many more).
Social welfare follows a utilitarian approach to aggregate the valuations of agents,
and it has several drawbacks. Most prominently, social welfare tends to assign items
only to the agents with high numerical values, and as such can determine a highly
unfair allocation. Towards this end, several works have started to consider an egal-
itarian approach by optimization of max-min fairness : Allocate items to maximize
the minimum of valuations. There has been significant progress in terms of improved
approximation algorithms, especially for a restricted variant of additive valuations
termed the Santa Claus problem (see, e.g., [5, 7, 14, 33, 4] and more).
Social welfare and max-min fairness represent two extremes on a spectrum of ag-
gregation methods. While social welfare tends to focus only on highest-valued agents,
max-min fairness tends to focus only on the smallest-valued agent. An interesting
trade-off between these extremal objectives is the Nash social welfare: Allocate items
to maximize the geometric mean of valuations. It has been proposed in the classic
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game theory literature by Nash [42] when solving the bargaining problem. It is closely
related to the notion of proportional fairness studied in networking [35] – in contrast
to both social welfare and max-min fairness it is invariant to individual scaling of
each agent valuation with a possibly different constant factor. Moreover, for divisible
items the optimal Nash social welfare is achieved via the classic fairness notion of
competitive equilibrium with equal incomes [41].
The algorithmic problem of allocating indivisible items to maximize the Nash
social welfare is far from being well-understood. Only recently, it has started to
attract significant research interest in the literature on approximation algorithms. The
problem is known to be NP- [43] and APX-hard [37], even for additive valuations. As a
remarkable result, Cole and Gkatzelis [18] gave the first constant-factor approximation
algorithm for additive valuations, where the constant was recently improved to 2 [17].
Constant-factor approximation algorithms for additive valuations can also be obtained
using methods from the domain of stable polynomials [1]. Moreover, these algorithms
have been extended to provide a 2-approximation in multi-unit markets with agent
valuations, which remain additive-separable over items [9], but might be concave in
the number of copies received for each item [2].
In this paper, we provide the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the
maximum Nash social welfare in markets with a class of non-separable submodular
valuation functions. In particular, we show how to obtain in polynomial time a
(2e1/(2e)+ ε)-approximation for budget-additive valuation functions, for any constant
ε > 0. These valuations are given by non-negative numbers vij ≥ 0 for every agent i
and item j, as well as a utility cap ci > 0 for every agent i. The valuation of agent i
for any subset S of items is vi(S) = min(ci,
∑
j∈S vij).
The analysis of budget-additive valuations significantly advances our understand-
ing beyond additive-separable and towards submodular ones. The handling of non-
separability requires several new insights and techniques that we explain in detail be-
low. Moreover, budget-additive valuations are of interest in a variety of applications,
most prominently in online advertising [39, 38]. They have been studied frequently
in the literature, e.g., for offline social welfare maximization [3, 6, 48, 15, 34], online
algorithms [11, 21], mechanism design [12], Walrasian equilibrium [46, 28], and market
equilibrium [8, 17].
1.1. Contribution and Techniques.
Approximation algorithm and FPTAS. Our main contribution is the first
constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare with
budget-additive valuations. We obtain an approximation factor of (2e1/(2e) + ε) in
polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0. We also show a lower bound of
√
8/7 > 1.069
for approximating the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations, unless
P=NP. The best previous result was a lower bound of 1.00008 derived for additive
valuations [37].
In contrast to the approaches based on stable polynomials [1, 2], our algorithm
relies on relaxing the problem to a class of Fisher markets and then rounding an
equilibrium allocation to an integral assignment. Conceptually, this appears similar
to the algorithm by Cole and Gkatzelis [18], but there are many challenges that need
to be overcome for non-separable valuations.
First, to guarantee a bounded approximation factor in the final rounding step,
we introduce earning limits into the resulting Fisher market. For additive valuations,
this creates a market with a convex set of equilibria. For budget-additive valuations,
where we have earning and utility limits, we show that the set of market equilibria can
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be non-convex. Hence, in contrast to the additive case, the toolbox for solving convex
programs (e.g., ellipsoid [17] or scaling algorithms [18, 8]) is not directly applicable
for computing an equilibrium. Instead, we design a new algorithm to compute an
approximate equilibrium. Based on a constant ε > 0, it perturbs the valuations
and rounds the parameters vij up to the next power of (1 + ε). Then it computes
an exact equilibrium of the perturbed market in polynomial time, which represents
an approximate equilibrium in the original market. This yields a novel FPTAS for
markets with earning and utility limits, which might be of independent interest. We
note that the non-convexity of equilibria also applies to perturbed markets, which
is surprising since we show an exact polynomial-time algorithm for computing an
equilibrium.
To compute an exact equilibrium in the perturbed market, we first obtain an
equilibrium (prices p, allocation x) of a market that results from ignoring all utility
caps [17, 9]. This is not an equilibrium of the market with both caps, because some
buyers may be overspending. Let the surplus of a buyer be the money spent minus
the money needed to earn the optimal utility, and similarly let the surplus of a good
be the target earning minus the actual earning. Let S be the set of buyers who have
positive surplus at prices p. Our idea is to pick a buyer, say k, in S and decrease
the prices of goods in a coordinated fashion. The goal is to make k’s surplus zero
while maintaining the surpluses of all goods and all buyers not in S to be zero. We
show that after a polynomial number of iterations of price decrease, either the surplus
of buyer k becomes zero or we discover a good with price 0 in equilibrium. Picking
a particular buyer is crucial in the analysis, because we rely on this buyer to show
that a certain parameter strictly decreases. This implies substantial price decrease of
goods and polynomial running time.
Given such an exact equilibrium with respect to perturbed valuations, we provide
a new rounding algorithm that turns the fractional equilibrium allocation into an in-
tegral one. While the algorithm exploits a tree structure of the equilibrium allocation
as in [18], the rounding becomes much more challenging and we must be careful to
correctly treat agents that reach their utility caps in the equilibrium. In particular,
we first conduct several initial assignment steps to arrive at a solution where we have
a set of rooted trees on agents and items, and each item j has exactly one child agent
i who gets at least half of its fractional valuation from j. In the main step of the
rounding algorithm, we need to ensure that the root agent r receives one of its child
items. Here we pick a child item j that generates the most value for r. A problem
arises at the child agent i of j, since r receiving j could decrease i’s valuation by a lot
more than a factor of 2. Recursively, we again need to enforce an allocation for the
root agent, thereby “stealing” fractional value from one of its grandchildren agents.
This approach may seem hopeless to yield any reasonable approximation guarantee,
but we show that overall the agents only suffer by a small constant factor.
Our analysis of this rounding procedure provides a new lower bound on the Nash
social welfare obtained by the algorithm, which is complemented with a novel upper
bound on the optimum solution. Both bounds crucially exploit the properties of agents
(goods) that reach the utility (earning) caps in the market equilibrium. These bounds
imply an approximation factor of 2e1/(2e) < 2.404. Since the equilibrium conditions
apply with respect to perturbed valuations, we obtain a (2e1/(2e) + ε)-approximation
in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0.
Complexity of exact equilibria. In addition to the FPTAS, we examine the
complexity of computing an exact equilibrium in Fisher markets with earning and
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utility limits. We treat a class of markets with a sufficiency condition termed as money
clearing, which holds, in particular, for all instances resulting from the Nash Social
Welfare problem. For such markets, we show that computing an exact equilibrium
lies in PPAD ∩ PLS.
For membership in PLS we first design a finite-time algorithm to compute an
exact equilibrium. We define a finite configuration space such that the algorithm
proceeds through a sequence of configurations. We show that configurations in the
sequence do not repeat and the algorithm terminates with an equilibrium. By defining
a suitable potential function over configurations, we show that the problem is in PLS.
As a refinement, for a constant number of buyers or sellers, we show that the number
of configurations is polynomially bounded using a cell decomposition technique. This
implies that our algorithm computes an equilibrium in polynomial time if the number
of buyers or goods is constant.
For membership in PPAD we first derive a formulation as a linear complementarity
problem (LCP). It captures all equilibria, but it also has non-equilibrium solutions.
To discard the non-equilibrium solutions, we incorporate a positive lower bound on
several variables. This turns out to be a non-trivial adjustment, because a subset of
prices may be zero at all equilibria, so we must be careful not to discard equilibrium
solutions. Then, we suitably add an auxiliary variable to the LCP and apply Lemke’s
algorithm [19]. Under the money clearing condition, we can show that the algorithm
is guaranteed to converge to an exact equilibrium. This, with a result of Todd [49],
proves the problem lies in PPAD.
1.2. Related Work. The Nash social welfare is a classic objective for allocation
of goods to agents. It was proposed by Nash [42] for the bargaining problem as
the unique objective that satisfies a collection of natural axioms. Since then it has
received significant attention in the literature on social choice and fair division (see,
e.g. [13, 20, 45, 29] for a subset of notable recent work, and the references therein).
For indivisible items and general non-negative valuations, the problem of maxi-
mizing the Nash social welfare is hard to approximate within any finite factor [43].
For additive valuations, the problem is APX-hard [37], and efficient 2-approximation
algorithms based on market equilibrium [18, 17] and stable polynomials [1, 2] exist.
These algorithms have been extended to give a 2-approximation also in markets with
multiple copies per item [9] and separable concave valuations [2].
For divisible items, the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare is solved by
competitive equilibria with equal incomes (CEEI) [41]. These equilibria often can be
computed by solving convex programs due to Eisenberg and Gale [26] or Shmyrev [47].
For additive valuations, there are combinatorial [22] and even strongly polynomial-
time algorithms [44, 51] for computing such an equilibrium.
Unfortunately, even for additive valuations CEEI can be exponentially more valu-
able than optimal solutions for indivisible items. To obtain an improved bound on
the indivisible optimum, Cole and Gkatzelis [18] introduced and rounded spending-
restricted equilibria with earning caps for every good. More generally, equilibria in
markets with earning limits are described by a convex program [17]. They can be
computed and rounded efficiently to obtain a 2-approximation for additive valuations
and any number of indivisible items [9].
Budget-additive valuations are a popular class of submodular valuation functions,
especially due to applications in online advertising [38]. They are additive valuations
with a global limit, which makes the valuation non-separable. These utility limits have
been recently proposed and studied in Fisher markets, and the equilibria are described
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by a convex program [8, 17]. An equilibrium in these markets can be computed using
algorithms for concave generalized flows [50], the set of equilibria forms a lattice, and
equilibria with maximum or minimum prices can also be obtained efficiently [8].
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We introduce notation
and preliminaries in the following Section 2. The rounding algorithm for maximizing
the Nash social welfare and the analysis of its approximation factor are presented in
Section 3. In Section 4.1 we discuss the existence of market equilibria under the money
clearing condition. The FPTAS for perturbed markets is discussed in Section 4.2. The
following sections contain our results on computing exact equilibria – membership in
PLS (Section 4.3), the polynomial-time algorithms for a constant number of buyers
or goods (Section 4.4), and membership in PPAD (Section 4.5). Finally, we conclude
in Section 5 by proving a bound on approximation hardness for maximizing the Nash
social welfare.
2. Preliminaries.
Nash Social Welfare. There is a set B of n agents and a set G of m indivisible
items, where we assume m ≥ n. We allocate the items to the agents, and we represent
an allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) using a characteristic vector x
S with xSij = 1 iff j ∈ Si
and 0 otherwise. Agent i ∈ B has a value vij ≥ 0 for item j and a global utility
cap ci > 0. The budget-additive valuation of agent i for an allocation S of items is
vi(x
S
i ) = min
(
ci,
∑
j∈G vijx
S
ij
)
. The goal is to find an allocation that approximates
the optimal Nash social welfare, i.e., the optimal geometric mean of valuations
max
S
(∏
i∈B
vi(x
S
i )
)1/n
.
Our approximation algorithm in Section 3 relies on rounding an approximate equilib-
rium for a linear Fisher market with earning and utility limits.
Fisher Markets with Earning and Utility Limits. In such a market there is a set
B of n buyers and a set G of m divisible goods. Each good is owned by a separate
seller and comes in unit supply. Each buyer i ∈ B has a value uij ≥ 0 for a unit
of good j ∈ G and an endowment mi ≥ 0 of money. Suppose buyer i receives a
bundle of goods xi = (xij)j∈G with xij ∈ [0, 1], then the utility function is ui(xi) =
min
(
ci,
∑
j uijxij
)
, where ci > 0 is the utility cap.
The vector x = (xi)i∈B with
∑
i∈B xij = 1 for every j ∈ G denotes a (fractional)
allocation of goods to buyers. For an allocation, we call i a capped buyer if ui(xi) = ci.
We also maintain a vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) of prices for the goods. Given such prices
p, a demand bundle x∗i of buyer i is a bundle of goods that maximizes the utility of
buyer i for its budget, i.e., x∗i ∈ argmax
{
ui(xi) |
∑
j pjxij ≤ mi
}
. For price vector
p and buyer i, we use λi = minj pj/uij and denote by αi = 1/λi the maximum bang-
per-buck (MBB) ratio (where we assume 0/0 = 0). Given prices p and allocation x,
the money flow fij from buyer i to seller j is given by fij = pjxij . If price pj > 0,
then xij uniquely determines fij and vice versa.
For the sellers, let xj =
∑
i xij , then the seller utility is uj(xj , pj) = min(dj , pjxj)
= min (dj ,
∑
i fij), where dj > 0 is the earning or income cap. We call seller j a
capped seller if uj(xj , pj) = dj . An optimal supply e
∗
j allows seller j to obtain the
highest utility, i.e., e∗j ∈ argmax {uj(ej , pj) | ej ≤ 1}.
We consider three natural properties for allocation and supply vectors:
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1. An allocation xi for buyer i is called modest if
∑
j uijxij ≤ ci. By definition,
for uncapped buyers every demand bundle is modest. For capped buyers, a
modest bundle of goods xi is such that ci =
∑
j uijxij .
2. A demand bundle xi is called thrifty orMBB if it consists only of MBB goods:
xij > 0 only if uij/pj = αi. For uncapped buyers every demand bundle is
MBB.
3. A supply ej for seller j is called modest if ej = min(1, dj/pj).
Given a set of prices, a thrifty and modest demand bundle for buyer i minimizes
the amount of money required to obtain optimal utility. A modest supply for seller j
minimizes the amount of supply required to obtain optimal utility in equilibrium. Our
interest lies in market equilibria that have thrifty and modest demands and modest
supply. Note that they also emerge when earning and utility caps are not satiation
points but limits in the form of hard constraints on the utility in equilibrium (c.f.
[17]).
Definition 1 (Thrifty and Modest Equilibrium). A thrifty and modest (mar-
ket) equilibrium is a pair (x,p), where x is an allocation and p a vector of prices
such that the following conditions hold: (1) p ≥ 0 (prices are nonnegative), (2) ej is
a modest supply for every j ∈ G, (3) xj ≤ ej for every j ∈ G (no overallocation), (4)
xi is a thrifty and modest demand bundle for every i ∈ B, and (5) Walras’ law holds:
pj(ej − xj) = 0 for every j ∈ G.
Note that in equilibrium, if xj < ej, then pj = 0. Moreover, we assume that all
parameters of the market uij , ci, dj and mi for all i ∈ B and j ∈ G are non-
negative integers. Let U = maxi∈B,j∈G{uij,mi, ci, dj} be the largest integer in the
representation of the market.
Consider the following condition termedmoney clearing: For each subset of buyers
and the goods these buyers are interested in, there must be a feasible allocation of
the buyer money that does not violate the earning caps. More formally, let Bˆ ⊆ B
be a set of buyers, and N(Bˆ) = {j ∈ G | uij > 0 for some i ∈ Bˆ} be the set of goods
such that there is at least one buyer in Bˆ with positive utility for the good.
Definition 2 (Money Clearing). A market is money clearing if
(1) ∀Bˆ ⊆ B,
∑
i∈Bˆ
mi ≤
∑
j∈N(Bˆ)
dj .
When there are only earning limits, money clearing is a precise characterization of
markets that have thrifty and modest equilibria [9]. For markets with both limits, it
is sufficient for existence (see Section 4.1).
Perturbed Markets. Our FPTAS in Section 4.2 computes a thrifty and modest
equilibrium in a perturbed market M˜.
Definition 3 (Perturbed Utility, Perturbed Market). For a market M and a
parameter ε > 0, the perturbed utility of buyer i is given by u˜i(xi) =
∑
j u˜ijxij ,
where u˜ij ∈ {0, (1 + ε)k | integer k ≥ 0} such that
(2) u˜ij/(1 + ε) ≤ uij ≤ u˜ij , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G.
The perturbed market M˜ is exactly the market M where every buyer i ∈ B has
perturbed utilities u˜i.
In Section 4.2 we observe that an exact equilibrium in M˜ represents an ε-approximate
equilibrium for the unperturbed market M. Moreover, given an exact equilibrium of
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M˜, rounding this equilibrium to an integral assignment deteriorates the approxima-
tion factor of our algorithm for the Nash social welfare only by a small constant (see
Section 3.3).
3. Approximating the Nash Social Welfare. In this section, we present a
(2e1/(2e)+ ε)-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing the Nash social
welfare with budget-additive valuations, for every constant ε > 0.
If vij ≥ ci, we can equivalently assume that vij = ci since the valuation can be
at most ci. More formally, let v
′
ij = min(vij , ci) and v
′
i(x
S
i ) = min
(
ci,
∑
j∈G v
′
ijx
S
ij
)
.
The following lemma is straightforward and its proof is omitted.
Lemma 4. For every integral allocation x we have v′i(x) = vi(x).
Henceforth, we will assume that vij ≤ ci, for all i ∈ B, j ∈ G. We relate our
problem to a Fisher marketM with earning and utility limits in a direct way – inM,
we have a buyer i for each agent i and a divisible good j for each item j. For each
buyer i the budget mi = 1, uij = vij , and ci is the utility cap. Further, we assume
that each good j comes in unit supply, and its earning cap is dj = 1.
Lemma 5. If the market M is not money clearing, then the maximum Nash social
welfare for indivisible items is 0.
Proof. Obviously, if marketM is not money clearing, then there exists a subset B′
of buyers such that the sum of earning caps of goods in Γ(B′) = {j | vij > 0, i ∈ B′}
is less than the sum of budgets of buyers in B′. This implies that |Γ(B′)| < |B′|.
Hence, there is no allocation where each agent in B′ gets at least one item of positive
valuation. Thus, the Nash social welfare must always be 0.
When the market is not money clearing, every allocation has the optimal Nash
social welfare. It is easy to check condition (1) by a max-flow computation. We
therefore assume that our instance satisfies it. We show in Section 4.1 that a money-
clearing market M always has a thrifty and modest equilibrium.
Suppose we are given such an equilibrium (x,p). Our subsequent analysis in Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2 shows how to obtain a 2e1/(2e)-approximation for the Nash social
welfare based on any such equilibrium. In Section 3.3 we provide a guarantee for
rounding an equilibrium of the perturbed market, which can be computed in polyno-
mial time (see Section 4.2).
The Nash social welfare objective allows scaling the valuation function of every
agent i by any factor γi > 0. This does neither change the optimum solution nor the
approximation factor. Our first aim is to normalize the valuation function for agent
i based on the MBB ratio αi of buyer i in the market equilibrium (x,p).
In equilibrium, there can be a set of goods G0 = {j | pj = 0}. All buyers
B0 = {i | uij > 0 for some j ∈ G0} interested in any good j ∈ G0 have infinite MBB
ratio. Due to our equilibrium conditions, every i ∈ B0 must be capped and receive
allocation only from G0, i.e., ui(x) = ci and xij > 0 only if j ∈ G0 and uij > 0.
Moreover, since no buyer i ∈ B \ B0 has positive utility for any of the goods G0,
these goods are allocated only to B0. Therefore, we can treat items G0 and agents
B0 separately in the analysis.
For all i ∈ B \ B0, we normalize v′ij = vij/αi and c
′
i = ci/αi. This does not
change the demand bundle for buyer i, and thus (x,p) remains an equilibrium. In the
resulting instance, every such buyer has MBB of 1 in (x,p). Consequently, v′ij ≤ pj
for all i ∈ B \ B0, j ∈ G, where equality holds if and only if j is an MBB good of
buyer i. For simplicity we assume that v and c fulfill these conditions directly, i.e.,
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vij = v
′
ij and ci = c
′
i. Together with the fact that vij ≤ ci, ∀(i, j) this implies
(3) vij ≤ min(pj , ci), for all i ∈ B \B0, j ∈ G .
The following lemma is a helpful insight on the structure of equilibria.
Lemma 6.
(a) A buyer i ∈ B \ B0 spends mai = min(1, ci) units of money. Its valuation
vi(x) is equal to m
a
i . If i is capped, ci ≤ 1.
(b) If i is capped, it is allocated at least one unit of goods.
(c) If i is capped and j is an MBB good for buyer i. Then pj ≤ 1.
(d) If pj < 1, j is completely sold.
(e) The money spent on good j is paj = min(pj , 1).
Proof. An uncapped buyer i ∈ B \ B0 spends his entire budget as otherwise xi
would not be a demand bundle. Since MBB = 1, the valuation vi(x) is equal to the
money spent by i. If i is capped, its valuation is equal to ci and hence the money
spent is equal to ci.
Since vij ≤ ci always and ci = vi(x) for a capped agent, we have ci = vi(x) ≤
ci
∑
j xij and hence
∑
j xij ≥ 1.
If j is an MBB good for a capped buyer i, then pj = vij ≤ min(pj , ci) according
to (3) and hence pj ≤ ci ≤ 1, where the last inequality was established in (a).
If 0 < pj < 1, the supply ej = min(1, dj/pj) = min(1, 1/pj) = 1. Thus j is
completely sold.
Finally, the money spent on j is pjej = pj min(1, 1/pj) = min(pj , 1) = p
a
j .
3.1. Upper Bound. In this section, we obtain an upper bound on the optimal
Nash social welfare when valuations are normalized based on an equilibrium (x,p).
The bound relates to prices and utility caps of the capped buyers in (x,p). We denote
by Bc and Bu the set of capped and uncapped buyers in (x,p), respectively. Recall
that since (x,p) is a thrifty and modest equilibrium, buyers may not spend their entire
budget and sellers may not sell their entire supply. We denote by mai = min(1, ci)
the active budget of buyer i and by paj = min(pj , dj) the active price of good j.
The following result is a generalization of a similar bound shown in [18]. The main
difference is to carefully account for the contribution of capped buyers.
Theorem 7. For valuations v and caps c normalized according to equilibrium
prices p, we have
(∏
i∈B
vi(x
∗)
)1/n
≤

∏
i∈Bc
ci
∏
j:pj>1
pj


1/n
,
where x∗ is an integral allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare.
Proof. Consider an integral allocation x∗ that maximizes the Nash social welfare.
For the agents i ∈ B0 ⊆ Bc, a simple upper bound is
∏
i∈B0
vi(x
∗) ≤
∏
i∈B0
ci. To
obtain an upper bound on
∏
i∈B\B0
vi(x
∗), we have to work harder. We denote by
Gc the set of goods allocated to agents in Bc \ B0 in x∗ and by G1u = {j ∈ G | pj >
1;x∗ij = 1 for some i ∈ Bu} the set of items with price more than 1 that are assigned
in x∗ to buyers in Bu. Let B
1
u = {i ∈ Bu | x
∗
ij = 1 for some j ∈ G
1
u} be the set of
buyers from Bu that receive an item of G
1
u in x
∗. Note that |B1u| ≤ |G
1
u|.
We will construct a fractional allocation x˜ with
∏
i∈B\B0
vi(x
∗) ≤
∏
i∈B\B0
vi(x˜)
and then bound the latter product. A key step in the construction of x˜ is to bound
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∑
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x
∗). We have
∑
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x
∗) ≤
∑
i∈Bu\B1u
∑
j∈G\(Gc∪G1u)
pjx
∗
ij ≤
∑
j∈G\(Gc∪G1u)
pj
=
∑
i∈Bc\B0
ci + |Bu| − |G
1
u| −
∑
j∈Gc
paj
≤
∑
i∈Bc\B0
ci + |Bu| − |G
1
u| −
∑
i∈Bc\B0
vi(x
∗) .(4)
The first inequality holds since vij ≤ min(ci, pj) for all i and j and the goods in Gc
and G1u are allocated to the agents in Bc and B
1
u, respectively. The second line follows
since the total money flow into the goods is
∑
j∈Gc
paj + |G
1
u|+
∑
j∈G\(Gc∪G1u)
pj and
the total money flow out of the agents is
∑
i∈Bc\B0
ci+|Bu|. The last line follows from∑
i∈Bc\B0
vi(x
∗) ≤
∑
j∈Gc
paj . This holds since vi(x
∗) ≤ ci ≤ 1 for every i ∈ Bc \ B0
and hence any good j ∈ Gc can contribute at most min(ci, pj) ≤ min(1, pj) = paj to
vi(x
∗).
We now take a fractional improvement step and relax the integrality condition on
x∗ for buyers in B \ (B1u∪B0). We take the goods assigned to B \ (B
1
u∪B0) and redis-
tribute them fractionally among these buyers. However, we require that the fractional
solution respects the upper bound (4). We denote by x˜ the best solution obtained in
this improvement step. Note that the Nash social welfare can only increase. Further,
note that x˜ is integral for the buyers in B1u.
Since x˜ satisfies (4),
(5)
∑
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x˜) ≤ |Bu| − |G
1
u|+
∑
i∈Bc\B0
ci −
∑
i∈Bc\B0
vi(x˜) .
We want to bound∏
i∈B\B0
vi(x˜) =
∏
i∈Bc\B0
vi(x˜) ·
∏
i∈B1u
vi(x˜) ·
∏
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x˜)
≤
∏
i∈Bc\B0
vi(x˜) ·
∏
i∈B1u
vi(x˜) ·
(∑
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x˜)
|Bu \B1u|
)|Bu\B1u|
.
We will show that the maximum value is obtained when each buyer i ∈ Bc \B0 gets
value ci, each buyer i ∈ B1u gets exactly one good of G
1
u, i.e., |B
1
u| = |G
1
u|, and each
buyer i ∈ Bu \B1u gets value 1. This will prove the claim.
Assume first that
∑
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x˜) > |Bu \ B1u|. Then there must be a buyer
i ∈ Bc\B0 that gets value less than ci and hence less than one and a buyer i′ ∈ Bu\B1u
that gets value more than one. Since x˜ is allowed to be fractional for buyers in Bc\B0
and Bu \B1u, we can reallocate some amount of good from i
′ to i. This increases the
Nash social welfare, a contradiction. We now have
∑
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x˜) ≤ |Bu \B1u|.
Each buyer in i ∈ B1u gets at least one good j with price pj > 1 in x˜. Since
vij = min(ci, pj) > 1, we have vi(x˜) > 1 for all i ∈ B1u. Suppose now that at x˜
we have |B1u| < |G
1
u|, i.e., a buyer i
′ ∈ B1u gets at least two goods of G
1
u. Then (5)
implies that either
∑
i∈Bu\B1u
vi(x˜) < |Bu \B1u| and hence there is an i ∈ Bu \B
1
u with
vi(x˜) < 1 or there is an i ∈ Bc \ B0 that gets value less than ci and hence less than
one or both. Since x˜ is allowed to be fractional for buyers in Bc \B0 and Bu \B1u, we
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can reallocate one entire good from i′ to i. This increases the Nash social welfare, a
contradiction. We now have |B1u| = |G
1
u|, i.e., the goods of price higher than one are
in one-to-one correspondence to the buyers in B1u. Thus∏
i∈B\B0
vi(x˜) =
∏
i∈Bc\B0
ci ·
∏
j:pj>1
pj · (1)
|Bu\B
1
u| .
3.2. Rounding Equilibria. In this section, we give an algorithm to round a
fractional allocation of a thrifty and modest equilibrium (x,p) to an integral one.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the allocation graph (B ∪G,E) with
E = {{i, j} ∈ B ×G | xij > 0} is a forest [44, 25]. In the following, we only discuss
how to round the trees in (B \ B0) × (G \ G0). For trees in B0 × G0, the rounding
and the analysis are very similar, but independent of prices and slightly simpler (see
Appendix A). Consider the following procedure:
Preprocessing: It consists of three substeps.
(a) For each tree component of the allocation graph, assign some agent to be
a root node.
(b) For every good j keep at most one child agent. This child-agent i must
buy the largest amount of j among the child agents (ties are broken
arbitrarily) and must have an active budget which is less than twice the
price of j, i.e., mai /2 < pj. In other words, child agent i is cut off from
good j if a sibling buys more of good j (ties are broken arbitrarily) or
if pj ≤ m
a
i /2. Note that if a sibling buys more of good j, it also spends
more on good j.
(c) Agents whose connection to their parent-good is severed in step (b) be-
come roots.
Rounding: It consists of two substeps.
(a) Goods with no child agent are assigned to their parent agent.
(b) For each non-trivial tree component, do the following recursively: Assign
the root agent a child good j that gives him the maximum value (among
all children goods) in the fractional solution. Except in the subtree rooted
at j, assign each good to its child agent in the remaining tree. Make the
child agent of good j the root node of the newly created tree.
Lemma 8. After preprocessing, the valuation of each root agent r is at least
vr(x)/2. For all other agents i the valuation is at least vi(x). If good j has child
agents and pj > 1, then j keeps a child agent.
Proof. Whenever an agent i loses allocation because the connection to its parent-
good j is cut, a new tree component is being created and i becomes its root node.
Since vij ≤ ci, ∀(i, j), each capped agent needs to buy in total at least one unit of
goods, and each uncapped agent spends his entire budget. If i is cut from j, then
xij ≤ 1/2 or pj ≤ mai /2. In the former case, we distinguish cases. Since the total
spending on good j is at most one and a sibling of i spends at least as much on j as
i, i spends at most 1/2 on j. Thus, if i is uncapped, it receives at most half of its
utility from j. If i is capped, vijxij ≤ ci/2 = vi(x)/2, i.e., i receives at most half of
its utility from j. In the latter case, vijxij ≤ min{ci, pj} ≤ pj ≤ mai /2 = vi(x)/2, i.e.,
i receives at most half of its utility from j.
For a good j with child agents and pj > 1, the child agent i that buys most of j
is kept as a child since pj > 1/2 = m
a
i /2.
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Lemma 9. After step (a) of rounding, each tree component T has kT + 1 agents
and kT goods for some kT ≥ 0. Suppose agent i in T is assigned a good j with pj > 1
during step (a) of rounding. Then i spends all its money on j, and i is the only
agent that spends money on j. Moreover, the valuation of i after rounding is pj, and
Bc ∩ T = ∅.
Proof. The first part is straightforward since after step (a) of rounding, every
remaining good has exactly one parent agent and one child agent. For the second
part, consider any good j with price pj > 1. If j has children-agents, the one that
spends most on j stays as a child. Thus j is not assigned during preprocessing. If j
is a leaf of the initial forest, only its parent agent spends money on it, call it i. Since
the money inflow into j is one and i has only one unit to spend, only i spends on j
and i spends one unit on j. Thus i is not capped in the equilibrium and vij = pj
since j is an MBB-good for i and hence pj ≤ ci by (3). Thus the valuation of i after
rounding is pj and Bc ∩ T = ∅.
Lemma 10. After rounding, each agent i that is assigned its parent good obtains
a valuation of at least vi(x)/2.
Proof. Consider any good j in the tree in the rounding step. Since j was not
assigned to its parent agent during preprocessing, its price is at least half of the
active budget of its child agent, i.e., pj ≥ mai /2. Since j is MBB for i, vij = pj
and hence from this good the child-agent obtains a valuation of at least half of the
valuation in the equilibrium.
Consider a tree T at the beginning of the step (b) of rounding with kT +1 agents
and kT goods. Assume kT ≥ 1 first. Let a1, g1, a2, g2, . . . , al, gℓ, aℓ+1 be the recursion
path in T starting from the root agent a1 and ending at the leaf agent aℓ+1 such that
a1, . . . , aℓ+1 became root agents of the trees formed recursively during the rounding
step, and good gi is assigned to ai in this process, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Note that aℓ+1 is
not assigned any good in step (b) of rounding. However, as the proof of the following
Lemma shows, it must have been assigned some good during step (a) of rounding. We
denote by ki the number of children for agent ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. If kT = 0, then ℓ = 0
and a1 = aℓ+1 is the root of a tree containing no goods after step (a) of rounding.
Lemma 11. The product of the valuations of agents in T in the rounded solution
is at least (
1
2
)kT−ℓ+1
·
1
k1 · · · kℓ
·
∏
i∈T∩Bc
ci
∏
j∈T :pj>1
pj .
Proof. Let c¯i = min{1, ci}, ∀i ∈ B.
We first deal with the case kT = 0. Then ℓ = 0. If a good j of price pj > 1 is
assigned to a1 during step (a) of rounding, then the valuation of a1 after rounding is
pj and Bc ∩ T = ∅ by Lemma 9. This establishes the claim even without the leading
factor 1/2. If all goods assigned to a1 during step (a) of rounding have price at most
one then {j ∈ T : pj > 1} = ∅ and T ∩ Bc ⊆ {a1}. Moreover, the value of a1 after
preprocessing is at least va1(x)/2 = c¯a1/2. Rounding does not decrease the value.
We turn to the case kT ≥ 1. Let qi = xai,gi > 0 be the amount of good gi bought
by agent ai in the equilibrium, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Then ai spends qipi on good gi.
In the market equilibrium, the root agent a1 receives at least half of its valuation
from its children. Thus q1p1 ≥ c¯1/(2k1).
We next show that agent ai, 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ+1, receives at least value qi−1max(c¯i, pi−1)
from its children in the market equilibrium. Agent i can spend at most c¯i − qi−1pi−1
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on good i− 1. Thus it must spend qi−1pi−1 on its children in the market equilibrium.
This establishes the claim if c¯i ≤ pi−1. So assume pi−1 < c¯i. Agent i can receive at
most a fraction 1 − qi−1 of good i − 1. Hence the value it receives from this good is
at most (1− qi−1)pi−1 ≤ (1− qi−1)c¯i. Thus it must receive value at least qi−1c¯i from
its children goods.
qipi ≥ qi−1max(c¯i, pi−1)/ki for 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, since agent ai spends qipi on good gi
and this is at least a fraction 1/ki of what it spends totally on its children.
The product of the valuations of a1 to aℓ+1 in the rounded solution is at least
p1 . . . pℓ · qℓmax(c¯ℓ, pℓ). This holds since gi is assigned to ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and aℓ+1
receives a value at least qℓmax(c¯ℓ, pℓ) from its children in the market equilibrium.
Since these children are assigned to aℓ+1 during step (a) of rounding, it receives at
least this value in the rounded solution.
Combining the arguments above we obtain
p1 · · · pℓ·qℓmax(c¯ℓ, pℓ)
≥
c¯1
2q1k1
q1max(c¯2, p1)
q2k2
· · ·
qℓ−1max(c¯ℓ, pℓ−1)
qℓkℓ
· qℓmax(c¯ℓ+1, pℓ)
=
1
2
(
1
k1 . . . kl
)
c¯1 ·
∏
2≤i≤ℓ+1
max(c¯i, pi−1)
≥
1
2
(
1
k1 . . . kl
) ∏
1≤i≤ℓ+1
c¯i ·
∏
1≤i≤ℓ;pi>1
pi,
where the last inequality follows from max(c¯i, pi−1) ≥ c¯i ·max(1, pi−1) for all i.
Each of the remaining kT − ℓ agents in T get a value at least max(vi(x)/2, p),
where p is the price of the parent-good. Finally, since at most one good is assigned
to each agent during the rounding step, each capped good is assigned to a separate
agent, the product of the valuations of agents in T in the rounded solution is at least
(
1
2
)k−l+1 (
1
k1 . . . kl
) ∏
i∈T∩Bc
ci
∏
j∈T :pj>1
pj .
Theorem 12. The rounding procedure gives a 2e1/2e-approximation for the opti-
mal Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations. Note that 2e1/2e < 2.404.
Proof. Suppose there are trees T 1, T 2, . . . , T a at the beginning of the rounding.
Let ki+1 and ki be the number of agents and goods in tree T i, respectively. Let li+1
be the number of agents on the path in T i traced during the rounding step, and let
ki1, . . . , k
i
li
be the degrees of the number of children goods for agents along that path.
The bound in Lemma 11 for trees T ⊆ (B \B0)× (G \G0) can also be obtained
for our rounding of trees T ⊆ B0×G0 (Lemma 41 in the Appendix). Thus, the Nash
social welfare of the rounded solution is at least
(1
2
)∑a
i=1
(ki−li+1)(
1
k11 . . . k
1
l1k
2
1 . . . k
2
l2 . . . k
a
1 . . . k
a
la
) ∏
i∈Bc
ci
∏
j:pj>1
pj


1/n
≥
1
2
(
2
∑
i l
i∑
i
∑
j k
i
j
)∑
i
li/n

∏
i∈Bc
ci
∏
j:pj>1
pj


1/n
≥
1
2e1/2e

∏
i∈Bc
ci
∏
j:pj>1
pj


1/n
,
12
where the first inequality follows from
∏
i
∏
j k
i
j ≤ (
∑
i
∑
j k
i
j/
∑
i l
i)
∑
i
li and
∑
i(k
i+
1) ≤ n, and the second inequality uses
∑a
i=1
∑li
j=1 k
i
j ≤ n and the fact that (2x)
x is
minimum at x = 1/2e.
3.3. Rounding Equilibria of Perturbed Markets. Given a parameter ε′ >
0, our FPTAS in Section 4.2 computes an exact equilibrium for a perturbed market,
which results when agents have perturbed valuations v˜i(x) = min
(
ci,
∑
j v˜ijxij
)
with the same caps ci and v˜ij ≥ vij ≥ v˜ij/(1 + ε′). Suppose we apply our rounding
algorithm to the exact equilibrium for v˜. It obtains an allocation S such that
(∏
i
vi(x
S
i )
)1/n
≥
1
(1 + ε′)
(∏
i
v˜i(x
S
i )
)1/n
≥
1
(1 + ε′)
·
1
2e1/2e
(∏
i
v˜i(x
∗)
)1/n
≥
1
(1 + ε′) · 2e1/2e
·
(∏
i
vi(x
∗)
)1/n
.
If we apply the FPTAS with ε′, then this yields an approximation ratio of at most
2e1/2e + ε for ε = 2e1/(2e)ε′. We summarize our main result:
Corollary 13. For every ε > 0 there is an algorithm with running time polyno-
mial in n, m, logmaxi,j{vij , ci}, and 1/ε that computes an allocation which represents
a (2e1/2e + ε)-approximation for the optimal Nash social welfare.
4. Computing Equilibria.
4.1. Existence and Structure of Equilibria. Thrifty and modest equilibria
in markets with utility and earning limits have interesting and non-trivial structure.
For markets with utility limits, such an equilibrium always exists [8]. For markets with
earning limits, such an equilibrium may not exist, because uncapped buyers always
spend all their money. In these markets, the money-clearing condition is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium [9] (see also [17]
for the case that uij > 0 for all i ∈ B, j ∈ G).
We observe that in a marketM with both limits, money clearing is sufficient but
not necessary for the existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium. Our FPTAS below
gives an ε-approximate equilibrium in money-clearing markets, for arbitrarily small
ε. Since market parameters are finite integers, for sufficiently small ε this implies
existence of an exact equilibrium.
This is interesting since the structure of equilibria in such markets can be quite
complex. For example, in money-clearing marketsM there can be no convex program
describing thrifty and modest equilibria. This holds even if we restrict to the ones
that are Pareto-optimal with respect to the set of all thrifty and modest equilibria.
Equilibria for the corresponding markets without caps, or with either earning or
utility caps might not remain equilibria in the market with both sets of caps. Hence,
existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium in money-clearing markets M follows
neither from a convex program nor by a direct application of existing algorithms for
markets with only one set of either utility or earning caps. The following proposition
summarizes our observations.
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Proposition 14. There are markets M with utility and earning limits such that
the following holds:
1. M is not money-clearing and has a thrifty and modest equilibrium.
2. M is money-clearing, and the set of thrifty and modest equilibria is not con-
vex. Among these equilibria, there are multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria, and
their set is also not convex.
3. For a money-clearing market M and the three related markets – (1) with
only utility caps, (2) with only earning caps, (3) without any caps – the sets
of equilibria are mutually disjoint.
Proof. We provide an example market for each of the three properties.
Property 1: Consider a linear market with one buyer and one good. The buyer has
m1 = 2, utility u11 = 2, and utility cap c1 = 1. The good has earning cap d1 = 1.
The unique thrifty and modest equilibrium has price p1 = 2 and allocation x11 = 1/2.
Both seller and buyer exactly reach their cap. The active budget mai = 1 equals the
earning cap. Conversely, due to price 2, the supply is 1/2, for which the achieved
utility equals the utility cap. Note that the money clearing condition (1) is violated.
Property 2: Consider the following example. There are two buyers and two goods.
The buyer budgets are m1 = 2 and m2 = 32. The utility caps are c1 = ∞, c2 = 32,
the earning caps are d1 = 8, d2 = 26. The linear utilities are given by the parameters
u11 = u22 = 32, u12 = 128, and u21 = 2.
If we ignore all caps, the unique equilibrium has prices (2, 32) and buyer utilities
(32, 32). If we ignore the utility caps and consider only earning caps, the equilibrium
prices are (8y, 128y) and buyer utilities are (8/y, 8/y), for y ≥ 1. If we ignore the earning
caps and consider only utility caps, the equilibrium prices are (2, x) and buyer utilities
are (32, 32), for x ∈ [8, 32].
With all caps, the equilibria form two disjoint convex sets: either prices (2, x) and
buyer utilities (32, 32), for x ∈ [8, 26]; or prices (8y, 128y) and buyer utilities (8/y, 8/y),
for y ≥ 1. Note that (2, x) for x ∈ (26, 32] are not equilibrium prices, since this would
violate the earning cap of seller 2.
Observe that there are exactly two Pareto-optimal equilibria: prices (1, 6) (which
also represents income for the sellers) and buyer utilities (1, 1); and prices (5, 50)
(with income (3, 6) for the sellers) and buyer utilities (1/5, 1/5). The first equilibrium
is strictly better for both buyers, the second one strictly better for seller 1.
Property 3: Consider the following market with 2 buyers and 2 goods. The buyer
budgets are m1 = 100 and m2 = 11. The utility caps are c1 = 0.9, c2 = ∞. The
earning caps are d1 = 9, d2 =∞. The utilities are u11 = u22 = u12 = u21 = 1.
If we ignore all caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (55.5, 55.5). If we ignore the
buyer caps and consider only seller caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (102, 102).
If we ignore the seller caps and consider only buyer caps, the unique equilibrium
prices are (10, 10). For both buyer and seller caps, the unique equilibrium prices are
(20, 20).
Remark 1. Let us briefly explain that the proposition also holds for markets
resulting from the Nash social welfare problem, i.e., when all buyers have budgets
mi = 1 and all sellers have earning limits dj = 1. In fact, the restriction to unit
budgets and unit earning limits is without loss of generality.
We outline a transformation for the example for Property 2 above. First suppose
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that seller 1 is represented by 8 auxiliary sellers, where each one has 1/8 supply of the
good and an earning limit 1. Since all 8 auxiliary sellers sell the same good (with the
same utility values), their prices in equilibrium must be the same. Moreover, there is
a thrifty and modest equilibrium with unit earning limits fulfilled if and only if there
is one with an earning limit of 8 for seller 1 in the original market. In this way, we
can always transform any seller j into a set of dj auxiliary sellers with earning limit 1.
To normalize supply to 1 for auxiliary sellers, we can simply divide the utility values
of all buyers for their good by dj .
Now suppose we replace buyer 2 by 32 auxiliary buyers with budget 1 and the
same utility values u2j for each good j. Moreover, we set the caps for each auxiliary
buyer to 1. Since all auxiliary buyers have the same MBB ratio, MBB edges, and
a budget of 1, they always obtain the same utility in equilibrium. If there is an
equilibrium in the original market, we simply let the auxiliary buyers spend their
budget in proportion to the original buyer 2. Thereby, we obtain an equilibrium for
the new market. Similarly, if there is an equilibrium in the new market, buyer 2 can
simply imitate the spending strategies of the auxiliary buyers, which results in an
equilibrium for the original market. In this way, we can always transform any buyer
i into a set of mi auxiliary buyers with budget 1 and utility limit ci/mi.
4.2. Computing Equilibria in Perturbed Markets. In this section, we an-
alyze Algorithm 1 for computing an approximate equilibrium in money-clearing mar-
kets M. Recall that the input is uij ,mi, ci, dj , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G, where uij is the utility
derived by buyer i for a unit amount of good j, mi is the budget of buyer i, ci is the
utility cap of buyer i, and dj is the earning cap of seller j. For any ε > 0, Algorithm 1
computes an exact equilibrium in a perturbed market M˜, where we increase every
non-zero parameter uij to the next-larger power of (1 + ε).
Additional Concepts. Our algorithm steers prices and flow towards equilibrium
by monitoring the surplus of buyers and sellers. Note that a buyer i is capped if
miαi ≥ ci.
Definition 15 (Active Budget, Active Price, Surplus). Given prices p and flow
f , the active budget of buyer i is mai = min(mi, ci/αi), the active supply of seller j
is eaj = min(1, dj/pj), and the active price is p
a
j = pje
a
j = min(pj , dj). The surplus of
buyer i is s(i) =
∑
j∈G fij −m
a
i , and the surplus of good j is s(j) = p
a
j −
∑
i∈B fij.
Several graphs connected to the MBB ratio are useful here. As argued in [44, 25], we
can assume w.l.o.g. that the MBB graph is non-degenerate, i.e., it is a forest.
Definition 16 (MBB edge, MBB graph, MBB residual graph). Given prices p,
an undirected pair {i, j} is an MBB edge if i ∈ B, j ∈ G, and uij/pj = αi. The MBB
graph G(p) = (B ∪G,E) is an undirected graph that contains exactly the MBB edges.
Given prices p and money flow f , the MBB residual graph Gr(f ,p) = (B ∪ G,A) is
a directed graph with the following arcs: If {i, j} is MBB, then (i, j) is an arc in A;
if {i, j} is MBB and fij > 0, then (j, i) is an arc in A.
Let us also define a reverse flow network N−(p, Z) by adding a sink t to the
MBB graph. The network has nodes G ∪ B ∪ {t}, edges (i, t) for i ∈ B \ Z, and the
reverse MBB edges (j, i) if (i, j) is an MBB edge. All edges have infinite capacity.
The supply at node j ∈ G is paj , demand at node i ∈ B is m
a
i , and demand at node
t is
∑
j p
a
j −
∑
im
a
i . The flow in the network corresponds to money. Given a money
flow f in the network N−(p, Z), the surplus of buyer i ∈ B \ Z corresponds to flow
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Algorithm 1: FPTAS for M with Earning and Utility Caps
Input : Market M given by budgets mi, utility caps ci, earning caps dj ,
utilities uij , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G, approximation parameter ε;
Output: Equilibrium (x,p) of the perturbed market M˜
1 Construct M˜ by increasing each non-zero uij to the next-larger power of
(1 + ǫ), set U˜ ← maxij u˜ij , and run the rest of the algorithm on M˜
2 (f ,p)← equilibrium of M˜ when ignoring all utility caps
3 Z ← {i ∈ B | s(i) = 0} // set of zero surplus buyers
4 while Z 6= B do
5 k ← a buyer in B \ Z // s(k) > 0
6 while (s(k) > 0) and (minj∈G:pj>0 pj > 1/nU˜
n) do
7 Bˆ ← {k} ∪ {i ∈ B | i can reach k in the MBB residual graph}
8 Gˆ← {j ∈ G | j can reach k in the MBB residual graph}
9 p′ ← p and γ ← 1
10 Define pj ← γ · pj , ∀j ∈ Gˆ, and adjust active prices and budgets
accordingly as a function of γ
11 Decrease γ continuously down from 1 until one of these events occurs:
12 Event 1: A new MBB edge appears
13 Event 2: γ = MinFactor(p′, f , Bˆ, Gˆ, Z) // Algorithm 2
14 f ← FeasibleFlow(p, Z) // Algorithm 3
15 if minj:pj>0 pj ≤ 1/nU˜
n then
16 Choose any good ℓ ∈ argmin{pj | pj > 0}
17 Gˆ← {ℓ} ∪ {j ∈ G | j is connected to ℓ in the MBB graph }
18 Bˆ ← {i ∈ B | u˜ij > 0 for some j ∈ Gˆ}
19 Assign (xi)i∈Bˆ according to f
20 s(i)← 0, ∀i ∈ Bˆ and pj ← 0, ∀j ∈ Gˆ
21 Z ← Z ∪ {i ∈ B | s(i) = 0}
22 Assign xi according to f for all buyers i ∈ B that have not been assigned yet.
23 return (x,p)
on (i, t)
s(i) =
∑
j∈G
fij −m
a
i = fit .
Buyers in Z do not have edges to the sink. Hence, their surplus is fixed to 0 at every
feasible flow.
Algorithm and Analysis. Algorithm 1 computes an exact equilibrium of M˜. For
convenience, it maintains a money flow f . For goods with non-zero price, f is equiv-
alent to an allocation x. When the algorithm encounters a set of goods with price 0,
the buyers interested in these goods must be capped, and the algorithm determines a
suitable allocation for them by solving a system of linear equations.
The algorithm first calls a subroutine to compute a market equilibrium ignoring
the utility caps of the buyers. Such an equilibrium exists because the market is money-
clearing, can be computed in polynomial time [17, 9], and consists of a pair (f ,p) of
flow and prices such that the outflow of every good j is paj and the inflow of every
buyer i is mi. Given this equilibrium, the algorithm then initializes Z to the set of
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Algorithm 2: MinFactor
Input : Prices p, flow f , set of buyers Bˆ, set of goods Gˆ, set of zero-surplus
buyers Z
Output: Minimum price decrease consistent with the input configuration
1 E ← Set of MBB edges at prices p between Bˆ and Gˆ
2 Gc ← Set of goods from Gˆ that are capped at (f ,p)
3 Bc ← Set of buyers from Bˆ that are capped at (f ,p)
4 λi ← mink∈G pk/uik, ∀i ∈ Bˆ
5 Set up the following LP in flow variables g and γ:
min γ∑
i∈Bˆ gij = dj , ∀j ∈ Gc∑
i∈Bˆ gij = γpj, ∀j ∈ Gˆ \Gc∑
j∈Gˆ gij = γciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ gij ≥ γciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc \ Z∑
j∈Gˆ gij = mi, ∀i ∈ (Bˆ \Bc) ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ gij ≥ mi, ∀i ∈ (Bˆ \Bc) \ Z
gij = 0, ∀(i, j) 6∈ E
gij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Bˆ, j ∈ Gˆ
6 return Optimal solution γ of above LP
Algorithm 3: FeasibleFlow
Input : Perturbed market M˜, prices p, and set of zero-surplus buyers Z
Output: Feasible flow consistent with the input configuration
1 E ← Set of MBB edges at prices p
2 λi ← mink∈G pk/uik, ∀i ∈ B
3 Bc ← Set of capped buyers at p
4 Gc ← Set of capped goods at p
5 Set up the following feasibility LP in flow variables f :∑
i∈Bˆ fij = dj , ∀j ∈ Gc∑
i∈Bˆ fij = pj , ∀j ∈ G \Gc∑
j∈Gˆ fij = ciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ fij ≥ ciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc \ Z∑
j∈Gˆ fij = mi, ∀i ∈ (B \Bc) ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ fij ≥ mi, ∀i ∈ (B \Bc) \ Z
fij = 0, ∀(i, j) 6∈ E
fij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G
6 return Feasible solution f of above LP
buyers with surplus zero in (f ,p).
The following Invariants are maintained during the run of Algorithm 1:
• no price ever increases.
• if s(i) = 0 for a buyer i, it remains 0. Z is monotonically increasing.
• N−(p, Z) allows a feasible flow, i.e., s(i) ≥ 0 for every buyer i ∈ B and
s(j) = 0 for every good j ∈ G.
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More formally, the algorithm uses a descending-price approach. There is always a flow
in N−(p, Z) with outflow of a good j ∈ G equal to paj , in-flow into buyer i ∈ B ∩ Z
equal to mai , and in-flow into buyer i ∈ B \ Z at least m
a
i . Descending prices imply
that if a good (buyer) becomes uncapped (capped), it remains uncapped (capped).
The algorithm ends when Z = B, i.e., all buyers have surplus zero, and hence
(f ,p) is an equilibrium of M˜. In the body of the outer while-loop, we first pick a
buyer k whose surplus is positive. The inner while loop ends when either the surplus
of k becomes zero or the minimum positive price of a good, say ℓ, is at most 1/nU˜n,
where U˜ is the maximum parameter value of the perturbed utilities. In the former
case, the size of Z increases (in line 21). In the latter case, we obtain a set Gˆ of goods
connected to ℓ through MBB edges and a set Bˆ of buyers who have non-zero utility
for some good in Gˆ. Since the price of each good in Gˆ is so low and their surplus
is zero, each buyer in Bˆ must be capped. Hence we fix the allocation of buyers in
Bˆ according to the current money flow f , and set the prices of all goods in Gˆ and
surplus of all buyers in Bˆ to zero. Since the algorithm maintains goods with price 0
and buyers with surplus 0, the inner-while loop is executed at most m+ n times.
In the body of inner while-loop, we construct the set Bˆ of buyers and Gˆ of goods
that can reach buyer k in the MBB residual graph (see Definition 16). We then
continuously decrease the prices of all goods in Gˆ by a common factor γ, starting
from γ = 1. This may destroy MBB edges connecting buyers in Bˆ with goods in
G \ Gˆ. However, by definition of Gˆ there is no flow on such edges. For uncapped
goods in Gˆ (capped buyers in Bˆ), this decreases the active price (budget) by a factor
of γ. We stop if one of the two events happens: (1) a new MBB edge appears, and (2)
γ is equal to the minimum factor possible that allows a feasible flow with the current
MBB edges, i.e., in-flow into a good j ∈ Gˆ is equal to paj , out-flow of a buyer in Bˆ ∩Z
is equal to mai , and out-flow of a buyer in Bˆ\Z is at leastm
a
i . While the value of γ for
event (1) results from ratios of u˜ij , the value of γ for event (2) is found by Algorithm
2 based on a linear program (LP). Observe that the flow f and γ = 1 are a feasible
initial solution for the LP.
After the event happened, we update to a new feasible flow f using Algorithm 3.
For prices p and the set Z of zero-surplus buyers, the in-flow into a good j ∈ G must
be equal to paj , out-flow of a buyer in Z must be equal to m
a
i , and out-flow of a buyer
in B \ Z must be at least mai . Algorithm 3 sets up a feasibility LP to find such a
feasible flow. Observe that this feasibility set is non-empty due to Event 2.
The following lemma is straightforward, we omit the proof.
Lemma 17. The Invariants hold during the run of Algorithm 1.
Next we bound the running time of Algorithm 1. Event 1 provides a new MBB
edge between a buyer in B \ Bˆ and a good in Gˆ. Event 2 restricts the price decrease in
γ such that the Invariants are maintained. The event happens only if (1) at the value
of γ there is a subset of buyers S ⊆ Bˆ such that
∑
i∈S m
a
i =
∑
j∈Γ(S) p
a
j , where Γ(S)
is the set of goods to which buyers in S have MBB edges, and (2) further decrease of
prices would make the total active budget of buyers in S more than the total active
prices of Γ(S). This condition would violate the invariant that N−(p, Z) has a feasible
flow where the surplus of each good is zero.
If the subset S is equal to Bˆ or S contains buyer k, then the surplus of k in
every feasible flow is zero at such a minimum γ, and hence the inner-while loop ends.
Otherwise, the MBB edges between buyers in B \ S and goods in Γ(S) will become
non-MBB in the next iteration. So in each event of the inner-while loop, either a
new MBB edge evolves or an existing MBB edge vanishes. Next, we show that for a
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given buyer k, the total number of iterations of the inner-while loop is polynomially
bounded. For this, we first show that price of a good strictly decreases during each
iteration of inner-while loop.
Lemma 18. In each iteration of inner-while loop, the MBB ratio of buyer k strictly
increases.
Proof. Each iteration of the inner while-loop ends with one of the two events.
Clearly, Event 1 can occur only when the prices of goods in Gˆ strictly decrease, and
this implies that the MBB of buyer k strictly increases. In case of Event 2, as argued
above, there is a subset S ⊆ Bˆ of buyers such that
∑
i∈S m
a
i =
∑
j∈Γ(S) p
a
j , where
Γ(S) is the set of goods to which S have MBB edges.
If k ∈ S, then s(k) = 0 in this iteration. This implies that
∑
i∈S m
a
i <
∑
j∈Γ(S) p
a
j
at the beginning of this iteration, and since equality emerges, prices must have strictly
decreased and the MBB of k strictly increased.
If k 6∈ S, then S 6= Bˆ and flow on all MBB edges from Bˆ \ S to Γ(S) has
become zero. Note that there is at least one such edge due to the construction
of Bˆ and Gˆ. Using the fact that there was a non-zero flow on these edges and∑
i∈S m
a
i <
∑
j∈Γ(S) p
a
j at the beginning of this iteration, we conclude that prices of
goods must have strictly decreased and the MBB of k strictly increased.
Next we show that the price of a good substantially decreases after a certain
number of iterations. For this, we partition the iterations into phases, where every
phase has n2 iterations of the inner while-loop.
Lemma 19. Let p and p′ be the prices at the beginning and end of a phase, re-
spectively. Then p′j ≤ pj, ∀j ∈ G, and there exists a good ℓ such that p
′
ℓ ≤ pℓ/(1 + ε).
Proof. Due to Lemma 17, we have p′j ≤ pj , ∀j ∈ G. For the second part, note
that Bˆ always contains buyer k during an entire run of inner while-loop. Since
prices monotonically decrease, the MBB αk of buyer k monotonically increases. Fur-
ther, if there is a MBB path from buyer k to a good j, then we have, for some
(i1, j1), . . . , (ia, ja), (i
′
1, j
′
1), . . . , (i
′
b, j
′
b) and an integer c
αkpj =
∏
u˜i1j1 . . . u˜iaja∏
u˜i′
1
j′
1
. . . u˜i′
b
j′
b
= (1 + ε)c .
In each iteration, either a new MBB edge evolves or an existing MBB edge vanishes.
When a new MBB edge evolves, a new MBB path from buyer k to a good j gets
established. When an existing MBB edge vanishes, then an old MBB path from k to
a good j gets destroyed. Further, if there is an MBB path from a good j to buyer k,
then price of good j monotonically decreases. If there is no MBB path from a good
j to buyer k, then price of good j does not decrease. After O(n) events, there has to
be a good j such that initially there is an MBB path from k to j, then no MBB path
between them for some iterations, then again an MBB path between them. Let pj be
the price of good j at the time when there is no path between k and j, and let αk and
α′k be the MBB for buyer k at the time the MBB path between j and k was broken
and when it was later again established, respectively. Since pj does not change unless
there is a path between k and j, we have
αkpj = (1 + ε)
c1 and α′kpj = (1 + ε)
c2 , for some integers c1 and c2.
Since α′k > αk due to Lemma 18, we have α
′
k ≥ αk(1+ε). Let good l give the MBB to
buyer k at α′k, and let pl and p
′
l be the prices of good l when the MBB path between
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j and k was broken and when it was later established. This implies
uil/p
′
l = α
′
k ≥ αk(1 + ε) ≥ (1 + ε)uil/pl,
and p′l ≤ pl/(1 + ε).
Lemma 20. The number of iterations of inner while-loop of Algorithm 1 is at
most O(n3 log1+ε(nU˜
n
∑
imi)).
Proof. From Lemma 19, in each phase the price of a good decreases by a factor
of (1+ε). The number of iterations in a phase is O(n2). The starting price is at most∑
imi. If a price becomes at most 1/nU˜
n, the inner while-loop ends for a particular
buyer k. Hence, the number of phases is at most n log1+ε nU˜
n
∑
imi, and the number
of iterations of the inner while-loop is at most O(n3 log1+ε nU˜
n
∑
imi).
Theorem 21. For every ε > 0, Algorithm 1 computes a thrifty and modest equi-
librium in the perturbed market M˜ in time polynomial in n, U and 1/ε.
Proof. From Lemma 17, all invariants are maintained throughout the algorithm.
Hence, the surplus of each good is 0, the surplus of each buyer is non-negative, and
prices decrease monotonically. The algorithm ends when surplus of all buyers is zero.
During the algorithm, when the price of a good, say ℓ, becomes at most 1/nU˜n, where
U˜ is the largest perturbed utility parameter, then the price of all the goods connected
to ℓ by MBB edges is at most 1/n. Since the minimum budget of a buyer is at least
1, all buyers buying these goods have to be capped. That implies that there is an
equilibrium where prices of these goods are zero.
Lemma 20 shows that there are at most O(n3 log1+ε nU˜
n
∑
imi) iterations, which
can be upper bounded by O(n
4
/ε log(nU)). Each iteration can be implemented in
polynomial time.
Approximate Equilibrium. Our algorithm computes an exact equilibrium in M˜
in polynomial time. We show that such an exact equilibrium of M˜ represents an ε-
approximate equilibrium of M, thereby obtaining an FPTAS for the problem. Based
on ε, let us define the precise notion of ε-approximate market equilibrium, which is
based on a notion of ε-approximate demand bundle.
Definition 22 (Approximate Demand). For a vector p of prices, consider a de-
mand bundle x∗i for buyer i. An allocation xi for buyer i is called an ε-approximate
(thrifty and modest) demand bundle if (1)
∑
j uijxij ≤ ci, (2)
∑
j xijpj ≤ m
a
i , and
(3) ui(xi) ≥ (1 − ε)ui(x∗i ).
An ε-approximate (thrifty and modest) equilibrium differs from an exact equilib-
rium only by a relaxation of condition (4) to ε-approximate demand (c.f. Definition 1)
Definition 23 (Approximate Equilibrium). An ε-approximate (thrifty and mod-
est) equilibrium is a pair (x,p), where x is an allocation and p a vector of prices such
that conditions (1)-(3), (5) from Definition 1 hold, and (4) xi is an ε-approximate
demand bundle for every i ∈ B.
Note that our definition is rather demanding, since there are many further relaxations
(e.g., we require exact market clearing, modest supplies, exact earning and utility
caps, etc), some of which are found in other notions of approximate equilibrium in
the literature.
Lemma 24. An exact equilibrium (x,p) of M˜ is an ε-approximate equilibrium of
M.
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Proof. Let αi and α˜i be the MBB of buyer i at prices p w.r.t. utility ui and per-
turbed utility u˜i, respectively. Formally, αi = maxk∈G uik/pk and α˜i = maxk∈G u˜ik/pk.
At prices p, let u∗i and u˜
∗
i be the maximum utility buyer i can obtain in M and M˜,
respectively. Clearly u∗i = min{ci,miαi}, and u˜
∗
i = min{ci,miα˜i}.
Since (x,p) is an exact equilibrium of M˜, the MBB condition implies that xij >
0 only if u˜ij/pj = maxk∈G u˜ik/pk. Further, using (2) we get α˜i(1 + ε) > αi, ∀i.
This implies that u˜∗i > u
∗
i /(1 + ε) ≥ u
∗
i (1 − ε). Further, since u˜ij ≥ uij , we have∑
j xijpj = m
a
i , ∀i. In addition, since (x,p) is an exact equilibrium for M˜, we obtain∑
i xij = min{1, p
a
j/pj}, ∀{j ∈ G | pj > 0} and
∑
i xij ≤ 1, ∀{j ∈ G | pj = 0}. This
proves the claim.
Corollary 25. Algorithm 1 is an FPTAS for computing an ε-approximate equi-
librium for money-clearing markets with earning and utility limits.
4.3. Membership in PLS. In this section we show that the problem of com-
puting an exact equilibrium in a money-clearing market M is in the class PLS. We
first design Algorithm 4, a finite-time descending-price algorithm. It again relies on
the reverse flow network N−(p) = N−(p, ∅) defined in the previous section where Z
is an empty set. The algorithm starts by computing a market equilibrium ignoring the
utility caps of the buyers. This equilibrium exists since the market is money-clearing.
It is a pair (f ,p) of flow and prices for which the outflow of good j is equal to paj and
the inflow into buyer node i is mi.
We will maintain the following Invariants during the while-loop in Algorithm 4:
− No price ever increases.
− N−(p) allows a feasible flow.
In other words, our algorithm is descending-price, and there is always a flow in
N−(p) with out-flow of good j ∈ G equal to paj and in-flow into buyer i ∈ B at
least mai . The first invariant implies that once a good becomes uncapped, it remains
uncapped, and once a buyer becomes capped, it remains capped.
In the body of the while-loop, we first compute a balanced flow f . A balanced flow
is a maximum feasible flow in N−(p) which minimizes the 2-norm of surplus vector
s = (s(1), s(2), . . . , s(|B|)). The notion of balanced flow was introduced in [22] for
equilibrium computation in linear Fisher markets. It can be computed by n maxflow
computations. Consider two buyers i and k with different surplus, say s(i) > s(k).
If there is a good j connected to i and k by MBB edges, then there is no flow from
j to i. Otherwise, we could decrease fji, increase fjk by the same amount, and thus
decrease the 2-norm of the surplus vector.
Let δ be the maximum surplus of any buyer, and let Bˆ be the set of buyers with
surplus δ. We let Gˆ be the set of goods k that have non-zero flow to some buyer in Bˆ.
We then decrease the prices of all goods in Gˆ by a common factor γ. Starting with
γ = 1, we decrease it continuously. This may destroy MBB edges connecting buyers
in Bˆ with goods in G \ Gˆ, but, by definition of Gˆ, there is no flow on such edges.
For uncapped goods and capped buyers, this decreases the active price, respectively
budget by a factor of γ. We stop if one of four events happens: (1) an uncapped buyer
becomes capped, (2) a capped good becomes uncapped, (3) a new MBB edge appears,
and (4) a subset of Bˆ becomes tight. A subset T of buyers is called tight with respect
to prices p if
∑
i∈T m
a
i =
∑
j∈Γ(T ) p
a
j , where Γ(T ) ⊆ Gˆ is the set of goods connected
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Algorithm 4: Finite-Time Algorithm for Money-Clearing Markets
Input : Market M given by budgets mi, utility caps ci, earning caps dj ,
utilities uij , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G;
Output: Equilibrium prices p and allocation x
1 (f ,p)← equilibrium of M when ignoring all utility caps
2 while
∑
i s(i) > 0 do
3 f ← balanced flow in N−(p) // surpluses change similarly
4 δ ← maxi s(i)
5 Bˆ ← Set of buyers with surplus δ // δ > 0
6 Gˆ← {k ∈ G | fki > 0, i ∈ Bˆ}
7 Set γ ← 1, define pj ← γ · pj , ∀j ∈ Gˆ, and adjust active prices and budgets
accordingly as a function of γ
8 Decrease γ continuously down from 1 until one of these events occurs:
9 Event 1: An uncapped buyer becomes capped
10 Event 2: A capped good becomes uncapped
11 Event 3: A new MBB edge appears
12 Event 4: A subset of Bˆ becomes tight // N−(p) is feasible
13 f ← feasible flow in N−(p)
14 (f ,p)← MinPrices(f ,p)
15 x← FindAllocation(f ,p)
16 return (x,p)
to T in the MBB graph. Observe that there is a feasible flow in N−(p) iff we have∑
i∈S
mai ≤
∑
j∈Γ(S)
paj , ∀S ⊆ B.
Next we obtain a feasible flow f in N−(p), which is guaranteed by Event 4. We
then use an LP (Algorithm 5) to compute the pair (g,q) of flow and prices which
minimizes
∑
j qj subject to the constraints that (1) the same buyers are capped, (2)
the same goods are capped, and (3) the same edges are MBB as with respect to
(f ,p). Since the ratio of any two prices in a connected component of the MBB graph
is constant and f is a feasible solution to the LP, q ≤ p component-wise. These
observations imply:
Lemma 26. The Invariants hold during the run of Algorithm 4.
Finally, we find an equilibrium allocation using Algorithm 6. Here, we first obtain the
set Gˆ of zero-priced goods and the set Bˆ of buyers who have non-zero utilities for some
good in Gˆ. Clearly, the buyers of Bˆ must be capped. For the buyers and goods in Bˆ
and Gˆ respectively, we find an allocation by solving a feasibility LP which allocates
each buyer i a bundle of goods worth ci amount of utility. Note that this feasibility LP
is non-empty, because we always maintain all the Invariants (Lemma 26) throughout
the algorithm.
We call the tuple (E,Bc, Gc) a configuration, where E ⊆ B ×G is a set of MBB
edges, Bc ⊆ B is a set of capped buyers, and Gc ⊆ G is a set of capped sellers. At the
beginning of each iteration, we have a configuration based on the current prices. The
following lemma ensures that our algorithm makes progress towards an equilibrium.
Lemma 27. During the run of Algorithm 4, no configuration repeats.
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Algorithm 5: MinPrices
Input : Market M, prices p, flow f
Output: Minimum prices consistent with input configuration, feasible money
flow
1 E ← Set of MBB edges at prices p
2 Gc ← Set of capped goods at (f ,p)
3 Bc ← Set of capped buyers at (f ,p)
4 Solve the following LP in price variables q and flow variables g:
min
∑
j qj
uijqk = uikqj , for each pair of edges (i, j), (i, k) ∈ E
uijqk ≥ uikqj , for each pair of edges (i, j) ∈ E and (i, k) 6∈ E
qj ≤ dj , ∀j ∈ G \Gc
qj ≥ dj , ∀j ∈ Gc∑
i gij = dj , ∀j ∈ Gc∑
i gij = qj , ∀j ∈ G \Gc∑
j gij ≥ mi, ∀i ∈ B \Bc∑
j gij ≥ ciqj/uij , ∀i ∈ Bc where (i, j) ∈ E
mi ≥ ciqj/uij , ∀i ∈ Bc where (i, j) ∈ E
gij = 0, ∀(i, j) 6∈ E
qj ≥ 0; gij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G
5 return Optimal solution (g∗,q∗) of above LP
Algorithm 6: FindAllocation
Input : Market M, prices p, flow f
Output: Allocation x
1 Gˆ← {j ∈ G | pj = 0}
2 Bˆ ← {i ∈ B | uij > 0, j ∈ Gˆ}
3 Solve the following feasibility LP in allocation variables (xij)i∈Bˆ,j∈Gˆ:∑
j∈Gˆ uijxij = ci, ∀i ∈ Bˆ∑
i∈Bˆ xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Gˆ
xij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Bˆ, j ∈ Gˆ
4 xij ← fij/pj, ∀i ∈ B \ Bˆ, j ∈ G \ Gˆ
5 return x
Proof. An iteration ending with Event 1 or 2 grows the set Bc of capped buyers
or the set Gc of capped goods. Since these sets never loose members, no preceding
configuration can repeat. If the sum of prices is strictly decreased before an event,
i.e., γ < 1, none of the preceding configuration can repeat, since we find the minimum
possible prices for the current configuration at the end of each iteration. We will show
below that prices of the goods in Gˆ are strictly decreased when an iteration ends with
Event 3 or 4.
In case of Event 3, a new MBB edge appears from a buyer k in B \ Bˆ to a good j
in Gˆ. For such an edge to become MBB, γ must be strictly less than 1: Since k 6∈ Bˆ,
s(k) < δ in the balanced flow. Suppose γ = 1 then using this MBB edge from k to
j, we can increase the surplus of k and decrease the surplus of a buyer in Bˆ. This
decreases the 2-norm of the surplus vector, a contradiction.
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Next consider an iteration that ends due to Event 4, and suppose prices of goods
in Gˆ are not decreased. Note that the surplus of each buyer in Bˆ is δ > 0 and the
surplus of each good is 0. Hence, before we decrease prices in lines 8-12 of Algorithm 4,
we have ∑
j∈Gˆ
paj −
∑
i∈Bˆ
mai = δ · |Bˆ| .
When Event 4 occurs, a subset T ⊆ Bˆ becomes tight, i.e.,
∑
j∈Γ(T ) p
a
j −
∑
i∈T m
a
i = 0,
where Γ(T ) is the set of goods connected to T . However, δ · |T | =
∑
i∈T s(i) +∑
j∈Γ(T ) s(j) =
∑
j∈Γ(T ) p
a
j −
∑
i∈T m
a
i −
∑
i6∈T,j∈Γ(T ) fji = −
∑
i6∈T,j∈Γ(T ) fji, which
is a contradiction.
Theorem 28. Algorithm 4 computes in exponential time a thrifty and modest
equilibrium in money-clearing markets.
Proof. In each iteration, the balanced flow can be obtained in polynomial time
[22]. Consider the maximum γ at which an event occurs. The maximum γ for the first
three events can be easily obtained in polynomial time. For Event 4, we need to find
the maximum γ when a set of buyers become tight, which can be computed using at
most a linear number of max-flow computations [22, 8]. Finally, the LP in Algorithm 5
can be solved in polynomial time, hence each iteration can be implemented such that
it needs only polynomial time.
Due to Lemma 27, we have a different configuration at the beginning of each
iteration. The number of distinct configurations is finite, so Algorithm 4 terminates
with an equilibrium. The running time depends polynomially on n, m, U , and the
number of distinct configurations, which is at most 2O(n·m·(nm)).
Observe that our algorithm constructs an initial configuration in polynomial time.
Then, for each configuration, we can interpret the sum of consistent prices as objec-
tive function, which can be found by algorithm MinPrices. Furthermore, we can
define a suitable neighborhood among configurations. Algorithm 4 can be adapted to
efficiently search the neighborhood for a configuration that decreases the sum of con-
sistent prices. Also, we can compute in polynomial time an equilibrium for a market
Ms as a starting configuration for our algorithm. As such, our algorithm implements
the oracles for the class PLS.
Corollary 29. The problem of computing a thrifty and modest equilibrium in
money-clearing markets is in the class PLS.
Proof. We call a configuration feasible if the LP in Algorithm 5 is feasible and
its output makes the feasibility-LP of Algorithm 6 non-empty. Otherwise, we call
the configuration infeasible. For membership in PLS, we construct polynomial-time
computable neighborhood and cost functions on the set of configurations such that
the following property holds: A configuration has lowest cost among all its neighbors
(local optimum) if and only if it is an equilibrium.
For each feasible configuration, let the cost be the optimum value of the corre-
sponding LP. For each infeasible configuration, we define its cost to be prohibitively
high (n+m)Un+m+1
∑
i∈B mi. Each infeasible configuration has a unique neighbor
the starting configuration of Algorithm 4 (in line 1). Observe that we can take any
feasible configuration as the starting configuration in Algorithm 4. Hence, we define
the unique neighbor of each feasible configuration C as the next configuration in Al-
gorithm 4 when it is started with C. Clearly, both cost and neighborhood functions
are polynomial-time computable, and a configuration is a local optimum if and only
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if it is a thrifty and modest equilibrium. This proves the claim.
Remark 2. It is not clear how to use Algorithm 1 to show membership in class
PLS. The difficulty lies in defining a suitable configuration space and a potential
function.
4.4. Constant Number of Buyers or Goods. In this section, we show that
Algorithm 4 runs in polynomial time when either the number of buyers or the number
of sellers is constant. Consider the number of MBB graphs for a fixed set of capped
buyers and capped sellers. Using a cell decomposition technique, we show it is poly-
nomial when |B| or |G| is constant. We create regions in a constant dimensional space
by introducing polynomially many hyperplanes. The number of non-empty regions
formed by N hyperplanes in Rd is O(Nd). Thus, we get a polynomial bound on the
number of regions.
Next we show that each MBB graph maps to a particular region thus created.
Since the number of regions is polynomial, we get a polynomial bound on the number
of different MBB graphs. This implies that for any given set of capped buyers and
capped sellers, Algorithm 4 examines only polynomially many configurations. Since
the set of capped buyers only grows and the set of capped sellers only shrinks, this
implies a polynomial running time for Algorithm 4.
Theorem 30. Algorithm 4 computes in polynomial time a thrifty and modest
equilibrium in money-clearing markets with constant number of buyers or sellers.
Proof. For constant number of goods, consider the following set of hyperplanes
in (p1, . . . , p|G|)-space, where pj denotes the price of good j.
uijpj′ − uij′pj = 0, ∀i ∈ B, ∀j, j
′ ∈ G.
These hyperplanes partition the space into cells, and each cell has one of the signs <
,=, > for each hyperplane. Further, each MBB graph (B∪G,E) satisfies the following
constraints in p variables:
∀(i, j), (i, j′) ∈ E : uijpj′ − uij′pj = 0
∀(i, j) ∈ E & ∀(i, j′) 6∈ E : uijpj′ − uij′pj ≥ 0.
Now, for constant number of buyers consider the following set of hyperplanes in
(λ1, . . . , λ|B|)-space, where 1/λi denotes the MBB of buyer i.
λiuij − λi′ui′j = 0, ∀i, i
′ ∈ B, ∀j ∈ G.
These hyperplanes partition the space into cells, and each cell has one of the signs <
,=, > for each hyperplane. Further, each MBB graph (B∪G,E) satisfies the following
constraints in λ variables:
∀(i, j), (i′, j) ∈ E : λiuij − λi′ui′j = 0
∀(i, j) ∈ E & ∀(i′, j) 6∈ E : λiuij − λi′ui′j ≥ 0
In both cases, each MBB graph maps to a particular cell in the cell decomposition.
Since the number of cells are polynomially bounded for constant |G| or |B|, this
implies a polynomial bound on the number of different MBB graphs. Thus, since the
set of capped buyers only grows and the set of capped sellers only shrinks, we get a
polynomial running time for Algorithm 4.
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4.5. Membership in PPAD. In this section, we show that computing a thrifty
and modest equilibrium in money-clearing markets M is in the class PPAD. We first
derive a formulation as a linear complementarity problem (LCP). It captures all thrifty
and modest equilibria of M, but also has non-equilibrium solutions. To discard
the non-equilibrium solutions, we incorporate a positive lower bound on variables
representing prices of goods and MBB of buyers. This turns out to be a non-trivial
adjustment, because a subset of prices may be zero at all equilibria, so we must be
careful not to discard equilibrium solutions. Our approach is based on our previous
work [8], in which we gave a polynomial-time algorithm for markets Mb with utility
limits (and without earning limits) to find an equilibrium, whose prices are coordinate-
wise smallest among all equilibria.
Our approach can be summarized as follows. Consider a money-clearing market
M. Now suppose we remove all earning caps to obtain a marketMb. To this market
we apply the algorithm of [8] and obtain a min-price equilibrium (xmin,pmin). We
show that using pmin, the market M can be partitioned into two separate markets
M1 and M2. Market M1 consists of all goods with price 0 in pmin and all buyers
having non-zero utility for these goods. M2 consists of the remaining buyers and
goods. Since all buyers in M2 have no utility for goods in M1, we have that M2 is
money clearing if and only if M is money clearing.
Based on these two markets, we show that there is1 an equilibrium ofM that is an
equilibrium ofM1 and an equilibrium ofM2. We already know an equilibrium forM1
with price of 0 for every good. ForM2 we show that at every equilibrium, the price of
a good j is at least pminj . Using this lower bound on the equilibrium prices inM2, we
construct a modified LCP formulation M-LCP which exactly captures all equilibria
of M2. We suitably add an auxiliary scalar variable to M-LCP and apply Lemke’s
algorithm. IfM2 is money clearing, we show that Lemke’s algorithm is guaranteed to
converge to an equilibrium of M2. Composing this with the equilibrium of M1 gives
an equilibrium ofM. Further, using a result of Todd [49], this proves that computing
an equilibrium in money-clearing markets M is in PPAD.
4.5.1. LCP Formulation. We start our analysis by deriving an LCP formula-
tion to capture equilibria of M. The LCP has the following variables
• p = (pj)j∈G, where pj is the price of good j,
• f = (fij)i∈B,j∈G, where fij is the money spent on good j by buyer i,
• λ = (λi)i∈B, where 1/λi is the MBB of buyer i at prices p,
• δ = (δi)i∈B, where (mi − δi) is the active budget of buyer i,
• β = (βj)j∈G, where (pj − βj) is the active price of good j.
Let ⊥ denote a complementarity constraint between the inequality and the vari-
able (e.g., uijλi − pj ≤ 0 ⊥ fij ≥ 0 is a shorthand for uijλi − pj ≤ 0; fij ≥
0; fij(uijλi − pj) = 0).
1In fact, it can be shown that every equilibrium ofM has this property, but this is not necessary
for membership in PPAD.
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∀(i, j) ∈ (B,G) : uijλi − pj ≤ 0 ⊥ fij ≥ 0(6)
∀i ∈ B : δi ≥ mi − ciλi ⊥ δi ≥ 0(7)
∀i ∈ B :−
∑
j
fij ≤ −(mi − δi)⊥ λi ≥ 0(8)
∀j ∈ G : βj ≥ pj − dj ⊥ βj ≥ 0(9)
∀j ∈ G :
∑
i
fij ≤ pj − βj ⊥ pj ≥ 0(10)
Lemma 31. The LCP defined by (6)-(10) captures all equilibria of M.
Proof. Let (f ,p) be an equilibrium of M. Let 1/λi capture the MBB of buyer
i at prices p. Clearly, λi = minj:uij>0 pj/uij. From the optimal bundle constraint,
it is clear that fij > 0 only if uijλi − pj = 0. This implies that (p, f ,λ) satisfies
(6). The active budget mai of buyer i is min{mi, ciλi} and we have
∑
j fij = m
a
i .
Setting δi = max{0,mi − ciλi} satisfies (7). This further implies that mai = mi − δi,
and we get (8). Similarly, the active price paj of good j is min{pj, dj} and we have∑
i fij = p
a
j . Setting βj = max{0, pj − dj} satisfies (9). This further implies that
paj = pj − βj and we also get (10). This proves the claim.
Lemma 31 shows that all equilibria of M are captured by the LCP (6)-(10).
However, there are solutions to this LCP which are not market equilibria, e.g., λi =
pj = βj = fij = 0, ∀i, ∀j, and δi = mi, ∀i is an LCP solution but not an equilibrium.
To discard these non-equilibrium solutions in the LCP, we strive to include a positive
lower bound to all pj and λi.
Remark 3. Previous constructions [31, 32] of LCPs for market equilibria use
only a positive lower bound of 1 to the prices. In our case this is not sufficient, since
there are solutions where λi = fij = 0, ∀(i, j), and δi = mi, ∀i. As a consequence, we
need to establish positive lower bounds to all λi. Another difficulty arises from the
fact that a positive constant cannot be used as a lower bound, because there might
be prices that are zero in all equilibria. A positive lower bound for these prices would
discard all equilibria as solutions of the LCP.
To handle these difficulties we use our polynomial-time algorithm [8] for markets
Mb with utility caps. Consider market M and disregard all earning caps. The
resulting market is a market Mb, for which our algorithm from [8] can compute a
price vector pmin = (pminj )j∈G of a min-price equilibrium. A min-price equilibrium
has coordinate-wise smallest prices, i.e., for every good j the price pminj is the smallest
price of good j in all equilibria. As a consequence, the set S = {j ∈ G | pminj = 0}
includes all goods that have price zero in every equilibrium of market Mb. Let Γ(S)
be the set of buyers who derive non-zero utility from goods in S, i.e., Γ(S) = {i ∈
B | uij > 0, j ∈ S}.
We partition the market into two disjoint markets. Market M1 includes exactly
the goods of S and the buyers in Γ(S). Market M2 has the remaining goods and
buyers. By definition uij = 0 for every j ∈ S and i 6∈ Γ(S) and hence no buyer in M2
will ever spend on goods in M1. The min-price equilibrium (xmin,pmin) yields an
equilibrium for M1, since all utility caps for all i ∈ Γ(S) are reached and all earning
caps for all j ∈ S are satisfied. We will next establish that there is an equilibrium for
M2 in which every good j 6∈ S has a price pj ≥ pminj for all j 6∈ S. Then no buyer
M1 will ever spend on goods from M2, justifying the separation of the markets.
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Lemma 32. In every equilibrium for market M2, pj ≥ pminj , ∀j 6∈ S.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium of M2 where the price of some good j is
pj < p
min
j . Note that at p
min, the sum of prices of goods inM2 is exactly equal to the
sum of active budgets of buyers inM2. Since (xmin,pmin) is a min-price equilibrium,
there is an uncapped buyer in every MBB component ofM2. Let γ = mink∈G pk/pmink
and let j be a good for which pj/p
min
j = γ. Now consider an MBB component C
containing good j at p. Since γ < 1 and there is an uncapped buyer in every MBB
component of M2 at pmin, we can conclude that the total prices of goods in C will
be less than the total active budgets of buyers in C, which is a contradiction.
Next we derive an LCP for marketM2 using the lower bound on the price of each
good as given in Lemma 32. At this point, we need to solve the equilibrium problem
for M2 only, so let B2 = B \ Γ(S) and G2 = G \ S denote the sets of buyers and
goods in M2, respectively. For the lower bound on λi’s we define
(11) Λ
def
= 1/2 min
i∈B2,j∈G2: uij>0
{pminj /uij}.
Consider the following modified LCP in variables (λ,p′, f , δ,β), where price of
good j is p′j + p
min
j :
∀(i, j) ∈ (B2, G2) :uij(λi + Λ)− (p
′
j + p
min
j ) ≤ 0⊥ fij ≥ 0(12)
∀j ∈ G2 :
∑
i
fij ≤ p
′
j + p
min
j − βj ⊥ p
′
j ≥ 0(13)
∀i ∈ B2 : −
∑
j
fij ≤ −(mi − δi) ⊥ λi ≥ 0(14)
∀i ∈ B2 : δi ≥ mi − ci(λi + Λ) ⊥ δi ≥ 0(15)
∀j ∈ G2 : βj ≥ p
′
j + p
min
j − dj ⊥ βj ≥ 0(16)
The constraints (12)-(16) represent the M-LCP. Next we show that this LCP
exactly captures all market equilibria of M2.
Lemma 33. A solution of M-LCP is a thrifty and modest equilibrium of M2 and
vice-versa.
Proof. Lemmas 31 and 32 show that every equilibrium of M2 is a solution of
M-LCP. For the other direction, consider a solution (λ,p′, f , δ,β) of M-LCP. The
active price paj of good j is p
′
j + p
min
j − βj and the active budget m
a
i of buyer i is
mi − δi. Clearly, mai > 0, ∀i ∈ B2 and p
a
j > 0, ∀j ∈ G2.
Next we claim that λi > 0, ∀i. Suppose λi = 0 for a buyer i, then fij = 0, ∀j due
to (12) and (11) which violates the left inequality of (14). Hence λi > 0, ∀i ∈ B2.
The constraints (12) ensure that fij > 0 then uij/(p
′
j+p
min
j ) = maxk∈G2 uik/(p
′
k+
pmink ), which implies that each buyer buys an optimal bundle.
Further, the constraints (14) together with the fact that λi > 0, ∀i ensure that
each buyer spends its entire active budget. Now we only need to show that each good
receives money equal to its active price, i.e.,
∑
i fij = p
a
j , ∀j ∈ G2.
Note that the prices pmin impose an equilibrium for M2 without the earning
caps. Let S′ = {j ∈ G2 | p′j = 0}. Clearly,
∑
i fij = p
a
j , ∀j ∈ G2 \ S
′ due to (13).
Let Γ(S′) be the set of buyers having at least one MBB good in S′ at prices pmin.
Since pmin is the min-price equilibrium without earning caps, the total active budget
of buyers in Γ(S′) is at least the total prices of goods in S′, i.e.,
∑
j∈S′ p
min
j .
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Now suppose we set prices pj = p
′
j+p
min
j ≥ p
min
j , ∀j ∈ G2. Since pj > p
min
j , ∀j ∈
G2 \ S′ and pj = pminj , ∀j ∈ S
′, buyers in Γ(S′) have all their MBB goods in S′ at
prices p and the active budget of the buyers in Γ(S′) is at least
∑
j p
min
j . Thus, we
have
(17)
∑
j∈S′
pminj ≤
∑
i∈Γ(S′)
mai .
Further, summing the left hand side inequality of constraints (13) and (14) for buyers
in Γ(S′) and using the fact that λi > 0, ∀i, we get∑
i∈Γ(S′)
mai =
∑
i∈Γ(S′),j∈S′
fij ≤
∑
j∈S′
paj =
∑
j∈S′
pminj −
∑
j∈S′
βj
The above with (17) imply that βj = 0, ∀j ∈ S′ and all inequalities are equalities.
Hence we have
∑
i fij = p
a
j , ∀j ∈ G2.
4.5.2. Lemke’s Algorithm. In this section, we apply Lemke’s algorithm (see
Appendix B for details) on the M-LCP. For this, we first add an auxiliary, non-
negative, scalar variable z in (8) and consider
(18) −
∑
j
fij − z ≤ −(mi − δi) ⊥ λi ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0
We denote by M-LCP2 the constraints (12-13), (18), (15-16). The primary ray of
M-LCP2 is z ≥ mi − δi, ∀i. The other variables are set to λ = 0, p′ = 0, f = 0,
δi = max{0,mi−Λci}, ∀i and βj = max{0, pminj −dj}, ∀j. In the proof of the following
theorem we show that under the money-clearing condition, there are no secondary
rays in M-LCP2. Hence, applied to this LCP Lemke’s algorithm will converge to an
equilibrium.
Theorem 34. Lemke’s algorithm applied toM-LCP2 converges to an equilibrium
in money-clearing markets.
Proof. We prove the result by contradiction. Suppose Lemke’s algorithm con-
verges on a secondary ray R, which starts at a vertex (λ∗,p
′
∗, f∗, δ∗,β∗, z∗) where
z∗ > 0 and the direction vector is (λo,p
′
o, fo, δo,βo, zo), i.e.,
R = {(λ∗,p
′
∗, f∗, δ∗,β∗, z∗) + α(λo,p
′
o, fo, δo,βo, zo), ∀α ≥ 0}.
Observe that (λo,p
′
o, fo, δo,βo, zo) ≥ 0. We consider three cases and show a contra-
diction in each of them.
Case 1: In this case p′o > 0, i.e., all prices are increasing on R. Since p
a
j = p
′
j +
pminj −βj = min{p
′
j+p
min
j , dj}, p
a
j = dj , ∀j on R. Further,
∑
i fij = p
a
j , ∀j on
R. Note that if λi = 0, then fij = 0, ∀j due to (6). This further implies that
fij > 0 only if λi > 0. Hence, using (18) we get
∑
i∈S(mi−δi)−z|S| =
∑
j dj ,
where S = {i ∈ B2 | λi > 0}. By money clearing (1), z = 0 and hence z∗ = 0;
a contradiction.
Case 2: In this case p′0 = 0, i.e., all prices are constant on R. Since p
′
o = 0, we
have λo = 0 and fo = 0 due to (6) and (10), respectively. This further
implies that δo = 0 and βo = 0. Together, they imply that zo > 0 because
the direction vector cannot be 0. Since zo > 0, we get λ∗ = 0 due to (18),
which subsequently implies f∗ = 0, p
′
∗ = 0, (δ∗)i = max{0,mi − ciΛ}, and
(β∗)j = max{0, pminj − dj}. This means that the secondary ray is a primary
ray; a contradiction.
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Case 3: In this case p′o ≯ 0 and p
′
o 6= 0, i.e., some prices are increasing and some are
constant on R. Let S′ = {j ∈ G2 | (p′o)j > 0}. This implies that p
a
j = dj and∑
i fij = dj ∀j ∈ S
′ due to (13). Prices of goods in S′ are increasing to infinity
on R, and these goods are sold upto their maximum possible revenue. Hence,
the buyers who buy these goods have zero utility for the goods outside S′,
because each buyer buys an optimal bundle, and the prices of goods outside
S′ are constant on R. Let Γ(S′) be the set of buyers buying goods in S′ on
R. This implies that λi > 0, ∀i ∈ Γ(S′) due to (6). Using (18) we get that∑
i∈Γ(S′)(mi − δi) − z|Γ(S
′)| =
∑
j∈S′ dj . This implies that z = 0 using the
money-clearing condition for the buyers in Γ(S′); a contradiction.
Corollary 35. The problem of computing a thrifty and modest equilibrium in
money-clearing markets is in the class PPAD.
Proof. By Theorem 34, Lemke’s algorithm must converge to an equilibrium for
money-clearing markets M. Note that Lemke’s algorithm traces a path on the 1-
skeleton of a polyhedron. Let v be a vertex on the path found by Lemke’s algorithm.
To prove membership in PPAD, we need to show that the unique predecessor and
successor of v on this path can be found efficiently. Clearly, these two vertices, say
u and w, can be found simply by pivoting. To determine which vertex leads to
the start of the path, i.e., the primary ray, and which leads to the end, we use a
result by Todd [49] on the orientability of the path followed by a complementary
pivot algorithm. It shows that the signs of the sub-determinants of tight constraints
satisfied by the vertices u, v and w provide the orientation of the path. This concludes
the proof of membership in PPAD.
Remark 4. We note that a money-clearing marketM can be reduced to a more
general Leontief-free market [32]. However, the agents in the reduced market remain
satiated because buyers and sellers in M are thrifty. The results for Leontief-free
markets in [32] (such as membership in PPAD) require non-satiation of agents. Hence,
these results are not directly applicable to markets M via such a reduction.
5. Hardness of Approximation. In this section, we provide a result on the
hardness of approximation of the maximum Nash social welfare with budget-additive
valuations. The best previous bound was a factor of 1.00008 for the special case
of additive valuations [37]. Our improved lower bound of
√
8/7 > 1.069 follows by
adapting a construction in [15] for (sum) social welfare,
Theorem 36. There is no
√
8/7-approximation algorithm for Nash social welfare
with budget-additive valuations unless P=NP.
Proof. Chakrabarty and Goel [15] show hardness for (sum) social welfare by re-
ducing from MAX-E3-LIN-2. An instance of this problem consists of n variables and
m linear equations over GF(2). Each equation consists of 3 distinct variables. For
the Nash social welfare objective, we require slightly more control over the behavior
of the optimal assignments. Therefore, we consider the stronger problem variant Ek-
OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2, in which each variable occurs exactly k times in the equations.
Theorem 37 ([16]). For every constant ε ∈ (0, 14 ) there is a constant k(ε) and
a class of instances of Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2 with k ≥ k(ε), for which we cannot
decide if the optimal variable assignment fulfills more than (1− ε)m equations or less
than (1/2 + ε)m equations, unless P=NP.
Our reduction follows the construction in [15]. We only sketch the main properties
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here. For more details see [15, Section 4].
For each variable xi we introduce two agents 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉. Each of
these agents has a cap of ci = 4k, where k is the number of occurrences of xi in the
equations. Since in Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2 every variable occurs exactly k times,
we have ci = 4k for all agents. Moreover, for each variable xi there is a switch item.
The switch item has value 4k for agents 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉, and value 0 for every
other agent. It serves to capture the assignment of the variable – if xi is set to xi = 1,
the switch item is given to 〈xi : 0〉 (for xi = 0, the switch item goes to 〈xi : 1〉). When
given a switch item, an agent cannot generate value for any additional equation items
defined as follows.
For each equation xi + xj + xk = α with α ∈ {0, 1}, we introduce 4 classes of
equation items – one class for each satisfying assignment. In particular, we get class
〈xi : α;xj : α;xk : α〉 as well as classes 〈xi : α¯, xj : α¯, xk : α〉, 〈xi : α¯, xj : α, xk : α¯〉
and 〈xi : α, xj : α¯, xk : α¯〉. For each of these classes, we introduce three items. Hence,
for each equation we introduce 12 items in total. An item 〈< xi : αi, xj : αj , xk : αk〉
has a value of 1 for the three agents 〈xi : αi〉, 〈xj : αj〉, and 〈xk : αk〉, and value 0 for
every other agent.
It is easy to see that w.l.o.g. every optimal assignment of items to agents assigns
all switch items. Hence, every optimal assignment yields some variable assignment
for the underlying instance of Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2.
Consider an equation xi + xj + xk = α that becomes satisfied by setting the
variables (xi, xj , xk) = (αi, αj , αk). Then none of the agents 〈xi : αi〉, 〈xj : αj〉, and
〈xk : αk〉 gets a switch item, and we can assign exactly 4 equation items to each of
these agents (for details see [15]). Hence, all 12 equation items generate additional
value. In particular, it follows that if xi is involved in a satisfied equation, one of its
agent gets a switch item, and the other one can receive at least 3 equation items.
Consider an equation xi + xj + xk = α that becomes unsatisfied by setting the
variables (xi, xj , xk) = (αi, αj , αk). Then for one class of equation items, all agents
that value these items have already received switch items (for details see [15]). This
class of items cannot generate additional value. Hence, at most 9 equation items
generate additional value. They can assigned to the agents that did not receive
switch items such that each agent receives 3 items. In particular, it follows that if xi
is involved in an unsatisfied equation, one of its agents gets a switch item, and the
other one can receive at least 3 equation items. Hence, we can ensure that in every
optimal solution the overall Nash social welfare is never 0.
We now derive a lower bound on the optimal Nash social welfare when (1− ε)m
equations can be satisfied. In this case, we obtain value 4k for n agents that receive
the switch items. Moreover, we get an additional total value of 12m(1 − ε) + 9mε
generated by the equation items. Note that m = kn/3. We strive to lower bound
the Nash social welfare of such an assignment. For this, it suffices to consider the
assignment indicated above – for each satisfied equation, all incident agents without
switch items get 4 equation items. For each unsatisfied equation, all incident agents
without switch items get 3 equation items. To obtain a lower bound on the Nash
social welfare, we assume a value of 4k for a maximum of n(1 − ε) agents, while the
others get a value of 3k. Therefore, when an assignment of items to agents generates
Nash social welfare of more than(
(4k)n · (4k)n(1−ε) · 3knε
)−2n
= k · 4
1
2 · 4
1
2 · (3/4)
ε
2 ,
we take this as an indicator that at least m(1− ε) equations can be fulfilled.
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In contrast, now suppose only (1/2+ ε)m equations can be fulfilled. In this case,
we obtain value 4k for n agents that receive the switch items. Moreover, we get an
additional total value of at most 12m(1/2+ε)+9m(1/2−ε) = 10.5m+3εm generated
by the equation items. We strive to upper bound the Nash social welfare of such an
assignment. For this, we assume that all agents that do not receive a switch item get
an equal share of the value generated by equation items, i.e., a share of 3.5k + kε.
Therefore, when an assignment of items to agents generates Nash social welfare of
less than
((4k)n · (k(3.5 + ε))n)
−2n
= k · 4
1
2 · (3.5 + ε)
1
2 ,
we take this as an indicator that at most m(1/2 + ε) equations can be fulfilled.
Hence, if we can approximate the optimal Nash social welfare by at most a factor
of
4
1
2 · (3/4)
ε
2
(3.5 + ε)
1
2
=
(
4 · (3/4)ε
3.5 + ε
) 1
2
,
we can decide whether the instance of Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2 has an optimal as-
signment with at least m(1−ε) or at most m(1/2+ε) satisfied equations. This shows
that we cannot approximate Nash social welfare with a factor of
√
8/7 > 1.069 unless
P=NP.
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Appendix.
Appendix A. Rounding Trees with Zero Price Goods.
In this section, we give an algorithm to round trees T0 ⊆ B0×G0 of the equilibrium
(x,p) to an integral allocation. Recall that in such trees, all goods have price pj = 0
and all buyers reach their cap ci. Consider the following procedure which is similar to
the procedure in Section 3.2. It uses only the allocation x and does not rely on prices.
In particular, the only price-based assignment rule is in the preprocessing step, and
it can be replaced here with an equivalent, more direct criterion:
Preprocessing: It consists of three substeps.
(a) For each zero-price tree component of the allocation graph, assign some
agent to be a root node.
(b) For every good j keep at most one child agent. This child agent i must
buy the largest amount of j among the child agents (ties are broken
arbitrarily) and must receive a utility that is at least half of the total
utility, i.e., uijxij > ci/2. In other words, child agent i is cut off from
good j if a sibling buys more of good j (ties are broken arbitrarily) or if
uijxij ≤ ci/2.
(c) Agents whose connection to their parent good is severed in step (b) be-
come roots.
Rounding: It consists of two substeps.
(a) Goods with no child agent are assigned to their parent agent.
(b) For each non-trivial zero-price tree component, do the following recur-
sively: Assign the root agent a child good j that gives him the maximum
value (among all children goods) in the fractional solution. Except in the
subtree rooted at j, assign each good to its child agent in the remaining
tree. Make the child agent of good j the root node of the newly created
tree.
Prices pj play a role in exactly two places in Section 3.2.
First, when we assign a good j to the parent and drop the child agent i with
pj ≤ mai /2, this ensures that the valuation of agent i in the newly created tree is at
least half of the original valuation. We use this fact to prove Lemmas 8 and 10. In
case of zero price goods, our choice of assigning a good j to the parent and dropping
the child agent i if uijxij ≤ ci/2 is an equivalent notion in terms of allocation.
Second, in Lemmas 9 and 11 we argue that a good with price more than 1 is only
assigned to an uncapped agent i which gives agent i at least pj amount of value. Since
each agent of B0 is capped, we do not need this property in Lemmas 39 and 41.
As a result, the proofs of the following lemmas are almost completely identical to
the proofs of Lemmas 8-11, respectively, and hence are omitted.
Lemma 38. After preprocessing, the valuation of each root agent r is at least cr/2.
For all other agents i the valuation is at least ci.
Lemma 39. After step (a) of rounding, each tree component T has kT +1 agents
and kT goods for some kT ≥ 0.
Lemma 40. After rounding, each agent i that is assigned its parent good obtains
a valuation of at least ci/2.
Consider a zero-price tree T at the beginning of the step (b) of rounding with
kT +1 agents and kT goods. Assume kT ≥ 1 first. Let a1, g1, a2, g2, . . . , al, gℓ, aℓ+1 be
the recursion path in T starting from the root agent a1 and ending at the leaf agent
aℓ+1 such that a1, . . . , aℓ+1 became root agents of the trees formed recursively during
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the rounding step, and good gi is assigned to ai in this process, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Note
that aℓ+1 is not assigned any good in step (b) of rounding. However, it must have
been assigned some good during step (a) of rounding. We denote by ki the number
of children for agent ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. If kT = 0, then ℓ = 0 and a1 = aℓ+1 is the root
of a tree containing no goods after step (a) of rounding.
Lemma 41. The product of the valuations of agents in T in the rounded solution
is at least (
1
2
)kT−ℓ+1
·
1
k1 · · · kℓ
·
∏
i∈T
ci .
Appendix B. The Linear Complementarity Problem and Lemke’s Al-
gorithm.
Given an n× n matrix M , and a vector q, the linear complementarity problem2
asks for a vector y satisfying the following conditions:
(19) My ≤ q, y ≥ 0 and y · (q −My) = 0.
The problem is interesting only when q 6≥ 0, since otherwise y = 0 is a trivial
solution. Let us introduce slack variables v to obtain the equivalent formulation.
(20) My + v = q, y ≥ 0, v ≥ 0 and y · v = 0.
The reason for imposing non-negativity on the slack variables is that the first
condition in (19) implies q −My ≥ 0. Let P be the polyhedron in 2n dimensional
space defined by the first three conditions; we will assume that P is non-degenerate3.
Under this condition, any solution to (20) will be a vertex of P , since it must satisfy
2n equalities. Note that the set of solutions may be disconnected.
An ingenious idea of Lemke was to introduce a new variable and consider the
system, which is called the augmented LCP:
(21) My + v − z1 = q, y ≥ 0, v ≥ 0, z ≥ 0 and y · v = 0.
Let P ′ be the polyhedron in 2n + 1 dimensional space defined by the first four
conditions of the augmented LCP; again we will assume that P ′ is non-degenerate.
Since any solution to (21) must still satisfy 2n equalities, the set of solutions, say S,
will be a subset of the one-skeleton of P ′, i.e., it will consist of edges and vertices of
P ′. Any solution to the original system must satisfy the additional condition z = 0
and hence will be a vertex of P ′.
Now S turns out to have some nice properties. Any point of S is fully labeled in
the sense that for each i, yi = 0 or vi = 0.
4 We will say that a point of S has double
label i if yi = 0 and vi = 0 are both satisfied at this point. Clearly, such a point
will be a vertex of P ′ and it will have only one double label. Since there are exactly
two ways of relaxing this double label, this vertex must have exactly two edges of S
incident at it. Clearly, a solution to the original system (i.e., satisfying z = 0) will
be a vertex of P ′ that does not have a double label. On relaxing z = 0, we get the
unique edge of S incident at this vertex.
2We refer the reader to [19] for a comprehensive treatment of notions presented in this section.
3A polyhedron in n-dimension is said to be non-degenerate if on its d-dimensional faces exactly
n − d of its constraints hold with equality. For example on vertices (0-dimensional face) exactly n
constraints hold with equality. There are many other equivalent ways to describe this notion.
4These are also known as almost complementary solutions in the literature.
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As a result of these observations, it follows that S consists of paths and cycles.
Of these paths, Lemke’s algorithm explores a special one. An unbounded edge of S
such that the vertex of P ′ it is incident on has z > 0 is called a ray. Among the
rays, one is special – the one on which y = 0. This is called the primary ray and
the rest are called secondary rays. Now Lemke’s algorithm explores, via pivoting, the
path starting with the primary ray. This path must end either in a vertex satisfying
z = 0, i.e., a solution to the original system, or a secondary ray. In the latter case, the
algorithm is unsuccessful in finding a solution to the original system; in particular,
the original system may not have a solution.
Remark: Observe that z1 can be replaced by za, where vector a has a 1 in
each row in which q is negative and has either a 0 or a 1 in the remaining rows,
without changing its role; in our algorithm, we will set a row of a to 1 if and only
if the corresponding row of q is negative. As mentioned above, if q has no negative
components, (19) has the trivial solution y = 0. Additionally, in this case Lemke’s
algorithm cannot be used for finding a non-trivial solution, since it is simply not
applicable. However, Lemke-Howson scheme is applicable for such a case; it follows a
complementary path in the original polyhedron (20) starting at y = 0, and guarantees
termination at a non-trivial solution if the polyhedron is bounded.
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